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Abstract 
 
It is a commonplace that ekphrasis – the description in literature of a visual work of art – brings 
to the fore questions of representation and reference. Such questions are particularly associated 
with the ‘postmodern’; ekphrasis is thus often subsumed under the category of metafiction. 
There has been little critical attention, however, to how the ekphrastic mode might be 
understood in aesthetic terms. This thesis considers the nature of ekphrasis’s referential 
capacity, but expands on this to suggest a number of ways in which the ekphrastic mode evinces 
the aesthetic and ontological assumptions upon which a text is predicated.  
Two case studies illustrate how the ekphrastic mode can be figured to different effect. In 
comparing these two novels, this thesis argues that the ekphrastic mode makes clear the 
particular subject-object relations expressed by each. If Lukács is correct in asserting that the 
novel mode expresses a discrepancy between ‘the conventionality of the objective world and the 
interiority of the subjective one’, ekphrasis provides a fruitful but under-explored avenue for 
critical inquiry because, as a mode, it is situated at the point at which subject and object must 
converge.  
The first chapter of this thesis is concerned with Ben Lerner’s Leaving the Atocha Station (2011), a 
novel that includes both traditional ekphrastic descriptions and embedded photographs and 
references to critical theory that function ekphrastically. David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest 
(1996) provides a contrast: the novel makes continued reference to film – a medium defined by 
its temporal qualities – but as used in the novel the ekphrastic mode implies a fixed, ahistorical 
schema. The implications that such differences have on the novel mode and critical discourse 
are explored in the final section of the thesis.  
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Introduction 
 
But your eyes proclaim 
That everything is surface. The surface is what’s there 
And nothing can exist except what’s there. 
 
- John Ashbery, “Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror” 
 
Ashbery’s “Self-Portrait” is perhaps one of the most well-known examples of the ekphrastic 
mode – the description in literature of a visual work of art. The poem is also peculiar in 
Ashbery’s oeuvre: unlike much of his other work, it is a poem very much about the poet’s 
personal experience. The pronouns here still shift in the characteristic Ashbery way, but this is 
clearly a poem about a particular encounter with a particular artwork: when the speaker states ‘I 
saw it with Pierre in the summer of 1959’, there is no doubt as to the specificity of the subject-
object encounter being described (Ashbery 75). This combination of ekphrasis and particularity 
makes sense; if the poem is exceptional, it is because ekphrasis expresses the response to and 
reception of the art object, and is thus inescapably focused on the subjective, phenomenological 
experience of its apprehension. 
“Self-Portrait” might seem a peculiar starting point for a thesis focused on novelistic ekphrasis. 
Yet Ashbery’s poem is significant here because – in addition to the neat coincidence that both 
authors under discussion have quoted from it – it is the poem of Ashbery’s which, in Ben 
Lerner’s words, ‘doubts his poetry’ (Lerner Ashbery 212).1 In other words, it is a poem that uses 
the ekphrastic mode to express the limitations of the poem as a form. The ‘movement / Out of 
the dream into its codification’ is the movement from the vision of an art that can successfully 
capture a singular moment of experience to an art that is insufficient at rendering experience at 
all (Ashbery 73). “Self-Portrait” is therefore something of a paradox: it expresses the limitations 
of poetry through poetic form. In this thesis I want to suggest that the ekphrastic mode is 
particularly suited to this task: the convergence of subject and object required in the description 
                                                
1 The same quote from “Self-Portrait” appears in Leaving the Atocha Station (Lerner 146) and in Wallace’s short story “Little 
Expressionless Animals” in the collection Girl with Curious Hair (42).   
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of an artwork immediately brings to the surface questions of representation, aesthetics, and the 
possibility of a relationship between text and world.  
This thesis will analyse the ekphrastic moments and embedded art objects in the novels Infinite 
Jest, by David Foster Wallace, and Leaving the Atocha Station, by Ben Lerner. This will form the 
basis for a broader argument about the texts and the subject-object relations they describe. The 
particular nature of ekphrasis means that it highlights both the ontological and the aesthetic 
assumptions on which a fictional text is based; what the concept offers as a framework for 
inquiry, then, is a way in which to analyse both these aspects of a novel while remaining focused 
on the particular form of the novel itself. In this sense, in addition to analysing each text, I want 
to provide an example of how the ekphrastic mode is a productive object of inquiry in and of 
itself; though often subsumed under the idea of metafiction or self-reference – and therefore 
the ‘postmodern’ as a general category – the ekphrastic mode has a far richer and more varied 
critical history, and it can express far more in a text than simple reflexivity. 
This is not to suggest, however, that the choice of texts here is arbitrary. The fact that ekphrasis 
occurs in each novel evinces their common concerns; equally, because each novel employs the 
mode to such different effect, the gap between them provides the necessary space for critical 
inquiry. While both novels can be broadly classified as ‘contemporary’, the generation that 
elapsed between their writing is not irrelevant. It would be too easy to suggest that each is 
wholly representative of its time, but both novels are certainly products of their specific 
historical moments (although the narrative present of Infinite Jest is actually later than that of 
Leaving the Atocha Station). This is key: the major feature they have in common is a concern with 
their own possibility. If the novel is, as Lukács states, the product of a division between ‘the 
conventionality of the objective world and the interiority of the subjective one’, the novel is 
therefore relegated to the position of reinforcing this division, thus rendering itself superfluous 
(Lukács Novel 70). In approaching these texts, my aim is therefore neither to pit them against 
one another in order to declare one or the other the winner, nor to sublate their considerable 
differences in service of a productive synthesis. Instead, using the concept of ekphrasis as 
organising principle, I want to outline what it is that each text expresses of its own relation to 
the world in both form and content, and to consider whether this expression is internally 
coherent and consistent.   
It is important at this point to define to what, exactly, the term ‘ekphrasis’ will refer. This is 
more necessary than it might seem: while the term originates in ancient Greek, it has been 
subject to various critical definitions throughout history. James Heffernan defines it – in 
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accordance with its most common usage – as the ‘verbal representation of a visual 
representation’ (Heffernan 3). The most famous example of ekphrasis, Homer’s description of 
the shield of Achilles, falls into this category, but there are narrower definitions which specify 
that – as in Homer, or Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn” – the verbal response must come in the 
form of poetry, while the art object must be static and physical – a shield, or a vase. Such a 
strict definition seems unhelpful; the nature of ekphrasis means that it very often describes art 
objects that – like Achilles’ shield or Keats’ vase – do not actually exist. This lack of corporeal, 
non-textual presence seems to make redundant any definition of ekphrasis that reduces its 
application only to painting, sculpture or the objet d’art; the physical presence and stasis of such 
objects is illusory anyway. In more recent work on the subject, the term ekphrasis has been 
applied to an expanded field of referents. Siglind Bruhn suggests in his Musical Ekphrasis – as 
might be inferred from his book’s title – a broader conception of ekphrastic objects, and, 
further, that the representation itself need not even be verbal; instead, the important element is 
that of ‘transmedialization’ (Bruhn 51). This latter point, while interesting, places it outside the 
scope of a thesis focusing on literary texts; all the ekphrases I will discuss here are necessarily 
verbal representations. What is useful about Bruhn’s idea of transmedialization, however, is that 
it radically expands the possibilities of the term, allowing it to be applied to a broad range of 
subject-object encounters. Particularly relevant here is the inclusion of cinema: both novels 
contain ekphrastic descriptions of cinematic objects that will be discussed later in this thesis.  
In Ekphrasis: The Illusion of the Natural Sign, Murray Krieger puts the term to further work, 
suggesting that rather than simply a term of poetic description, ekphrasis can be understood as 
evincing a general principle of literary representation. Krieger refers to the term’s classical use as 
meaning a ‘verbal description of something, almost anything, in life or art’, extrapolating from 
this to suggest that ekphrasis offers a ‘device to interrupt the temporality of discourse, to freeze 
it during its indulgence in spatial exploration’ (Krieger 7). Krieger maintains that a distinction 
between what he calls ‘natural’ signs that act as a ‘visual substitute’ for their object of reference, 
and the arbitrary sign system of language is untenable; in focusing on the temporal elements of 
ekphrasis, Krieger argues that the mode offers the most ‘extreme and telling’ example of the 
spatial potential of the literary text (Krieger 2-6; 12). This concept – that the literary text is itself 
an object with a physical presence in the world – is explored by both Lerner and Wallace.   
While the extant critical work on ekphrasis greatly informs my argument here, I want also to 
depart from accounts such as Krieger’s by bringing ekphrasis into a dialogue with aesthetic 
theory. Despite the pressure put on questions of aesthetics through the inclusion of the 
ekphrastic mode or the embedded art object, there has, to my knowledge, been a lack of critical 
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attention to how such inclusions might function outside of the question of reference. In other 
words, the commonplace readings of ekphrasis as either a historical category, or as characteristic 
of postmodern reflexivity mean that its particular qualities as a mode of expression have been 
ignored. For this reason, I want here to look at examples of the ekphrastic mode in relation to 
an aesthetic tradition that is itself concerned with the relation of text to world. This question is 
the central organising principle for many of the developments in late-twentieth and early-
twenty-first century literature; as Peter Bürger argues, the reintegration of art and the praxis of 
life is what distinguishes the historical avant-garde. Ekphrasis is a fertile point from which to 
approach these questions because it is situated, conceptually speaking, at the intersection at 
which the object is perceived and translated into thought.  
Ekphrasis also acts as a useful organising principle for this discussion because unlike, say, the 
embedded novel or author figure, the difference in medium makes it somewhat easier to move 
away from questions of reference that focus only on text. It is also important to clarify, here, 
that in this thesis the concept of the mise en abyme – the artwork within an artwork – is not 
interchangeable with the ekphrastic mode. While the mise en abyme  suggests an embedded 
artwork that through its content sheds light on the content of the framing narrative, ekphrasis 
instead attends to the artwork’s response and reception. In other words, while the mise en abyme 
might reflect thematic elements (the classic example here is Hamlet’s embedded play), ekphrasis 
emphasises the process of reading itself. Similarly, recent work such as Benjamin Widiss’s 
Obscure Invitations exemplifies the problem with an approach focused on the author figure: 
Widiss examines a number of twentieth-century texts which include author figures, concluding 
with an affirmation of intentionality that seems unavoidable given his subject matter. On the 
other hand, critics such as Mark Currie approach ‘postmodern’ fiction with the view that its 
self-awareness, as evinced by inclusions such as authorial stand-ins, or art objects, aims to 
render the analysis of the critic ‘redundant in advance’ (Currie 155). Currie is useful in 
acknowledging – unlike Widiss – the complexity of intentionality; though his conclusions are 
comparatively pessimistic, he also gestures towards a criticism based not on exegesis (because 
this has been anticipated in the text itself) but on reading against the implied author. In moving 
the critical conversation from conventional understandings of metafiction to ekphrasis and 
embedded art objects, I hope to avoid both a return to authorial intention and the emphasis of 
authorial unreliability – to which both the authorial stand-in and mise en abyme devices necessarily 
lead – and to thus avoid the associated critical aporia that Currie anticipates. Similarly, I want 
also to dispel here the idea that ontological ‘levels’ exist within a text; I begin from the 
understanding that the text is itself a physical and conceptual object and that those ‘objects’ 
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referred to textually exist at the same level as the text itself; that is, there is no essential 
difference between media in terms of representational adequacy. Ekphrasis offers no ‘object’ – 
whether real or fictional – except the text. The question of representational adequacy is 
therefore somewhat redundant: there is nothing to represent. Instead, it is the process of 
representation – how the ekphrastic mode figures the art object – that is of value here. 
In addition to perhaps augmenting the current critical status of ekphrasis, I want also to 
comment on the criticism of both Lerner and Wallace. Criticism of the latter has expanded 
enormously in recent years, in both amount and methodology.2 Since Wallace’s death, there has 
also been an increase in non-academic publications by or about him.3 The rapid generation of 
something approaching a cottage industry surrounding Wallace means that a diverse range of 
critical lenses have been applied to his work, with varying degrees of success. Some recent 
criticism has taken into account the novel’s engagement with critical theory: Martin Paul Eve, 
notably, reads Infinite Jest and The Pale King alongside Thomas Pynchon and in light of the 
concept of ‘metamodernism’, a term coined by Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den 
Akker in their essay “Notes on Metamodernism”. Eve takes issue with certain aspects of 
Vermeulen and Akker’s text – particularly their reading of Kant – but concludes that the term 
‘metamodernism’ 
does hold value, not as a generic classification, but as a set of tropes that identify 
regulative utopianism through the dialectical image of a sincerity infused with 
naivety and undermined by scepticism. This specific constellation could be called 
the ‘metamodern aspect’ of a text. Metamodernism as a reading practice offers a 
means of excavating the latent ethical connotations of supposedly nihilistic 
postmodern texts, it is a tool for rethinking the millennial turning point for a new 
literary ethics. (Eve 22) 
While Eve’s use of the term ‘excavating’ here seems to conform to that critical mode Currie 
dismisses, his argument is useful in that it suggests a way of looking at Wallace that is informed 
by his own discussion of ethics without being circumscribed by them. While Wallace’s work is 
indubitably concerned with ethical questions, there is a tendency to look at such concerns 
through the lens of Wallace’s own words on the matter – the latter being increasingly readily 
                                                
2 The conception and expansion of the field of ‘Wallace studies’ is itself a topic worthy of investigation; such a study, while 
interesting, is not relevant to my purpose here. See, for example, the recently published Consider David Foster Wallace, a somewhat 
patchy collection of essays described by the editor, David Hering, as marking the ‘commencement’ of ‘Wallace studies’ (Hering 
9). Included are essays on a diverse range of topics: Fredric Jameson, geometry, the New Sincerity. Yet the major problem with 
this – and much other Wallace criticism – is what Stephen Burn (himself author of a number of books on Wallace) describes as 
‘a tone more suited to the proselytizing of fundamentalist religion than literary criticism’ (Burn Consider 467). For a less 
problematic collection of essays on Wallace, see The Legacy of David Foster Wallace (2012). 
3 See, for example: Wallace’s unfinished novel, The Pale King (2011); the essay collection Both Flesh and Not (2012); the print 
publication of the Kenyon commencement address (previously available for free online) as This is Water (2009); a biography, 
D.T. Max’s Every Love Story is a Ghost Story (2012); Stephen Burn’s collection Conversations with David Foster Wallace (2012); a book 
of poetry and collage, Bough Down (2013), by Karen Green (Wallace’s widow); and the title essay of Jonathan Franzen’s 
collection Farther Away (2012).  
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available.4 Eve instead chooses to take seriously Wallace’s conception of ethics though finds it 
ultimately lacking in Infinite Jest because the novel oscillates (a characteristic of 
‘metamodernism’) between realism and experimentation, emotional empathy and ‘meta-
speculation’ (Eve 22).   
Extant criticism on Leaving the Atocha Station is, in contrast, practically non-existent.5 This is 
undoubtedly due in part to Lerner’s relative contemporaneity; Infinite Jest’s date of publication 
gives it a full fifteen year head-start in this regard. But there are other considerations, too: 
Lerner’s novel (my focus here, though his poetry – mostly published before Leaving the Atocha 
Station – is equally bereft of critical attention) is – perhaps to an even greater extent than Infinite 
Jest – surely the kind of text Currie has in mind when he discusses those textual devices 
designed to ‘anticipate’ their own criticism. To suggest that fiction which is engaged with 
philosophical or theoretical ideas is a new development would of course be ridiculous, but 
novels such as Infinite Jest and Leaving the Atocha Station pose a particular problem for literary 
study because they engage with criticism that directly relates to the situation of the novel in the 
world. Both novels refer to critical theory – in quite different ways, as we will see – explicitly 
within the text, but more importantly, in both novels form and content are informed by critical 
praxis. From a critical standpoint, then, while the lack of attention given to Lerner makes his 
work a fertile ground for inquiry, it also brings to the fore the question of what position might 
be available to the critic without following the critical voice of the text itself, or simply 
confirming this voice through presenting a reading in opposition to it.       
While the resonances between Infinite Jest and Leaving the Atocha Station are many, this thesis is 
for the most part not strictly comparative. In the first chapter I look at Lerner’s novel; in the 
second, Wallace’s. The nature of my argument in each chapter has dictated that their form 
remain continuous. Ekphrasis provides the point of entry for each novel, but its function in 
both novels creates a problem which I try to use critical theory to resolve, or at least to clarify. 
Hence this thesis incorporates the work of theorists themselves concerned with the relationship 
between subject, text and world – in particular György Lukács, Walter Benjamin, Theodor 
                                                
4 The ur-text for Wallace on ethical fiction is almost certainly his “E Unibus Pluram” essay and the interview with which it was 
originally published. Other oft-quoted sources are his Kenyon commencement address, now published as This is Water, and  the 
book-length interview with David Lipsky, Although Of Course You End Up Becoming Yourself. 
5 At the time of writing there is – to my knowledge – no published academic work on Lerner. Leaving the Atocha Station was, 
however, widely reviewed, prominent examples being James Wood in the New Yorker (discussed below, and republished in his 
essay collection The Fun Stuff) and Lorin Stein in The New York Review of Books. The latter is of some interest as it is the only 
example outside of this thesis in which Infinite Jest and Leaving the Atocha Station are brought into dialogue; Stein writes: ‘Since 
David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest, it has been one task of the realist novel to describe or at least acknowledge the portion of our 
lives spent looking at a screen’ (Stein n.p.).  
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Adorno and Gilles Deleuze – in order to further understand the ontological and aesthetic 
relations expressed in each novel.  
 
 
 
11 
 
 
Born Between Mirrors: Leaving the Atocha Station  
 
In perhaps the most prominent review of Ben Lerner’s Leaving the Atocha Station, the critic James 
Wood describes the novel’s central thesis thus: ‘it is one of the paradoxes of this cunning book 
that what might seem a skeptically postmodern comedy is also an earnestly old-fashioned seeker 
of the real’. Wood identifies an important element of the novel, but the word ‘real’ here is 
perhaps misleading; certainly, Lerner’s novel is concerned with the relationship between what 
the narrator, Adam Gordon, calls the ‘actual’ and ‘virtual’, yet this relationship is predicated not 
on the final triumph of either one category, but on the thoroughly dialectical character of their 
interaction.6 In this chapter I want to suggest that on reading the novel, it becomes clear that 
any distinction between ‘actual’ and ‘virtual’ is impossible to maintain, as demonstrated through 
the treatment of, and discourse around, the art object.  
The art object’s significance is made apparent in the first few pages of the novel. After a short 
description of his morning routine, Adam visits the Museo del Prado, where he likes to stand 
daily in front of Rogier van der Weyden’s The Descent from the Cross. What is interesting, here, is 
the ease with which Adam slips into the ekphrastic mode: ‘Mary is forever falling to the ground 
in a faint; the blues of her robe are unsurpassed in Flemish painting’ (Lerner Atocha 8). This 
contemplative insight is juxtaposed with what follows, as Adam appears to quote directly from 
the painting’s accompanying placard: ‘C.1435; 220 X 262 cm. Oil on oak panelling’ (8). While 
the former sentence fits squarely into the mode of ekphrastic, aesthetic contemplation – the 
‘forever falling’, with its suggestion of pathos; an awareness of the work’s place within the 
canon – the latter confuses this assumption: are we privy to Adam’s own experience (and 
knowledge) of the artwork, or is the whole section simply a quote from the work’s wall-text?  
In the paragraphs that follow, it seems we receive an answer: Adam observes a man who, upon 
viewing the van der Weyden, ‘[breaks] suddenly into tears’, and whom he begins to follow 
around a few rooms of the Prado (8). Adam’s interest is piqued because he wonders whether 
                                                
6 Lerner also uses the terms outside of the novel: see “The Actual World” (2013).  
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the man is having what he calls ‘a profound experience of art’, something of which he believes 
himself incapable (8). This self-reflection appears to clarify the earlier disjunction between 
artwork, response, and mediation: if Adam feels a ‘disconnect between [the] experience of 
actual artworks and the claims made on their behalf’, as he states, then what may have seemed 
to be an example of the ekphrastic mode is shown, in retrospect, to be an example only of this 
‘disconnect’ (9). The insights that Adam seemed to be producing himself may be understood as 
simply reproductions of the already-said; the language of art history and the discourse of art 
appreciation are repeated by Adam in place of any ‘profound’ experience of his own. The 
ekphrastic encounter is conventionally predicated on the art object being directly present to the 
speaker in order to create the necessary phenomenological encounter, yet here the presence of 
the van der Weyden does not prompt the subject’s contemplation as expected. This reading, 
however, ignores another statement Adam makes about the painting. His daily routine altered 
by the weeping man’s presence, Adam considers whether to view another work as substitute 
but concludes that he is ‘too accustomed to the painting’s dimensions and blues’ to do so (8). In 
other words, while Adam can identify the ‘disconnect’ between his expectations of the artwork 
and the encounter that actually occurs, he is also – perhaps unconsciously – attentive to the art 
object’s specific physicality and presence in the material world. This complicates the idea of a 
binary in which access to the ‘real’ is possible: attention to the art objects within the novel 
reveals a schema that is far more equivocal.   
Adam’s response to the painting makes clear that ekphrasis – especially in a contemporary 
context – is a mode fraught with ontological problems. In his Picture Theory, W.J.T. Mitchell 
describes the three ‘phases’ of the relationship between criticism and ekphrasis: the first, 
‘ekphrastic indifference’ is the neutral belief that the verbal and visual cannot be commensurate, 
because a verbal representation ‘cannot represent – that is, make present – its object in the same 
way a visual representation can’ (Mitchell 152). This then leads to ‘ekphrastic hope’, the point at 
which ‘the impossibility of ekphrasis is overcome in imagination or metaphor’; ekphrasis here 
becomes paradigmatic of linguistic expression’s own tendency towards the aesthetic, of ‘the 
shaping of language into formal patterns that “still” the movement of linguistic temporality into 
a spatial, formal array’ (Mitchell 153-4). This second kind of ekphrasis is clearly influenced by 
Krieger’s work; as Mitchell states, it is the point at which ekphrasis seems ‘paradigmatic of a 
fundamental tendency in all linguistic expression’ (Mitchell 152). This ‘utopian’ claim is 
contrasted with ‘ekphrastic fear’: as the boundary between the verbal and visual seems prone to 
collapsing, there comes the ‘moment in aesthetics when the difference between verbal and 
visual mediation becomes a moral, aesthetic imperative rather than (as in the first “indifferent” 
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phase of ekphrasis) a natural fact that can be relied on’ (Mitchell 154). Mitchell’s categories are 
useful in themselves when identifying how ekphrasis is figured in a particular text, but Mitchell 
also argues that the multitude of possible perspectives on ekphrasis suggests an ambivalence 
that is one of the principal themes of ekphrasis itself; it must ‘work through’ the ‘problems 
staged for it by the theoretical and metaphysical assumptions about media, the senses and 
representation’ (Mitchell 163-4). In addition to being ‘about’ the art object, then, the ekphrastic 
mode also entails a consideration of its response and implications.  
In Leaving the Atocha Station, the problems Mitchell finds in giving a totalising account of the 
ekphrastic mode are clearly evident. The implied binary between ‘actual’ art object and ‘virtual’ 
text is immediately complicated by the inclusion of verbal representations of the visual. Yet as 
Mitchell states, as a mode ekphrastic poetry or prose is no different from other descriptive or 
narrative discourse; grammatically speaking, ‘[e]kphrastic poems speak to, for, or about works 
of visual art in the way that texts in general speak about anything else’ (Mitchell 159). The 
problem of ekphrasis therefore comes from common assumptions about individual media: the 
visual arts, for example, are thought to be inherently spatial, while the verbal is in some sense 
abstract and characterised by non-corporeal objects: narratives, ideas, arguments. Such 
categorisation is of course reductive – ‘paintings can tell stories, make arguments, and signify 
abstract ideas: words can describe or embody static, spatial states of affairs’ – yet these 
assumptions show that the confusion of ekphrasis is not predicated on any essential semantic 
difference between media (Mitchell 160). Instead, Mitchell argues, the metaphor that the ‘the 
medium is the message’ has become axiomatic and has thus eclipsed the common relation all 
media have to their referents. Practical differences between media are therefore converted into 
‘metaphysical oppositions which seem to control our communicative acts, and which then have 
to be overcome with utopian fantasies like ekphrasis’ (Mitchell 161). In the case of Leaving the 
Atocha Station, the perception of an opposition between visual and verbal is similarly the result 
of certain assumptions about media rather than variations in the capacity for representational 
adequacy. Adam fails to convert his experience of the artwork into ekphrastic contemplation 
not because of a difference between the ability of different media to translate the object, but 
because, despite the painting’s physical presence, it remains phenomenologically distant and 
unable to be experienced at all.  
Representational adequacy is therefore not the most pressing question prompted by the art 
objects and ekphrastic passages in Lerner’s novel. Much of the problem and confusion of 
ekphrasis, in Mitchell’s account, lies in locating the art object’s situation within a given semiotic 
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system; a system which, as Mitchell points out, quite clearly does not differentiate between 
individual media, form or content. The question of representation is often posed with regard to 
ekphrastic objects that are themselves representative: many of the most oft-cited historical 
examples of ekphrasis fall into this group, from Homer’s Shield of Achilles passage in the Iliad, 
through Keats’s urn, to Auden’s “Musée des Beaux Arts”. Such ekphrastic moments seek – as 
Mitchell describes – to make present the absent art object, through representation: that is, 
through describing a description. This raises the question, however, as to how the ekphrastic 
encounter might function when the art object is itself focused on its own objecthood: an art 
object that is not figurative or even ‘abstract’ in the conventional sense (as this still seems to 
imply some degree of representation) but performative, theatrical, projecting towards the 
spectator (as per Michael Fried) rather than towards a final referent would surely create a 
problem in the conventional understanding of ekphrasis. Such art objects might point towards 
questions not of reference but of experience; attention to ekphrasis must therefore involve 
attention to both the referential capacity and the phenomenal – the spatial and haptic aspects, 
and the experience of the object in time – of any given encounter with the art object.  
In addition to the ekphrastic mode – or some approximation of it – the first section of Leaving 
the Atocha Station introduces another recurring device which similarly questions the easy 
equation of verbal and virtual, visual and actual. There are five photographs in the novel, each 
captioned with a quote from the body text, though these captions are never from the pages 
directly surrounding the photograph itself. The photographs are, however, generally linked with 
the point at which they intercept the narrative discourse: on page 11 there is a detail from van 
der Weyden’s The Descent from the Cross, just after the section in the Museo del Prado concludes; 
on page 103, a photograph of the Alhambra interrupts the discourse at the point where Adam 
returns from Granada with his quasi-girlfriend Isabel, wondering if he ‘would be the only 
American in history who had visited Granada without seeing the Alhambra’ (99). While they are 
linked to story events, the photographs do not necessarily serve an illustrative purpose; the 
knowledge of what the Alhambra looks like does not reveal anything further about the narrative 
itself. The detail of the van der Weyden might, one could argue, in some sense ‘illustrate’ – it is 
a visual representation of an object previously described in the discourse – yet this illustrative 
purpose is undermined by it being only a detail – and a grayscale one at that – of a work whose 
very importance to Adam is predicated on its ‘dimensions’ and ‘blues’.  
Recourse to the captions, then, seems necessary; as Walter Benjamin states in “The Work of Art 
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, the caption’s function is imperative in relation to the 
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photograph, as the caption comes to dictate the final signified itself (Benjamin 226). Unlike the 
relation of title to painting, Benjamin argues, the nature of the photographic caption is that of 
an ‘explicit’ signpost towards a referential telos – in the newspapers to which Benjamin is 
primarily referring, the meaning of a particular photograph is drastically altered by its caption 
(Benjamin 226). In the case of Leaving the Atocha Station, then, we might expect the caption to 
contextualise the photograph and link it to its surrounding text, allowing us to understand what 
exactly the photographs are illustrating. Yet in the novel the caption is not commensurate with 
the photograph: the captions do not allow the image to be contextualised or situated within a 
context of stable meaning. Instead, they do the exact opposite, taking images whose placement 
in the text makes sense even if their purpose remains unclear and destabilising them through 
reference to disparate textual events.  
The foregrounding of this incommensurability, or rather non-commensurability, is most evident 
in the photograph of Francisco Franco that appears towards the end of the novel (141). 
References to Franco can be found throughout the text, as Adam’s stated purpose in Madrid is 
to write a ‘long, research-driven poem’ on the literary legacy of the Spanish Civil War (23). The 
photograph depicts Franco as seen from below, speaking at a podium with his face obscured. 
Underneath is the caption: ‘“The proper names of leaders are distractions from concrete economic modes”’, a 
quote that comes from Adam himself, when, in an earlier conversation with Isabel, he tries ‘to 
sound deep, hoping concrete and mode were cognates’ (50). Initially, then, photograph and 
caption seem complementary: Franco’s face is not visible, therefore his specific identity is 
obscured; thus, the photograph could quite easily be read as a visual parallel to Adam’s 
statement. Yet such a reading is undermined, perhaps even before it can occur, by Adam 
himself: as readers, we have already experienced Adam making this statement, and reflecting on 
its multivalence. Throughout the novel, Adam’s first-person narration makes the reader privy to 
the discrepancy between what he says and what he is understood by others as meaning, a gap 
that is most apparent when he is with Isabel, with whom his ‘most intense and ostensibly 
intimate interactions were the effect of her imbuing my silences, the gaps out of which my 
Spanish was primarily composed, with tremendous intellectual and aesthetic force’ (46). Adam’s 
utterances are shown throughout the novel to be simply prompts for the exercise of meaning-
making on the part of the addressee, but this is unpredictable: Adam at one point expects Isabel 
to ask that he ‘was hers exclusively’; instead, she tells him she already has a boyfriend (93). This 
uncertainty of meaning is destabilised further by the fact that Adam’s silences themselves come 
to signify; in the context of verbal communication (which necessarily must frame any notion of 
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a ‘gap’ or ‘silence’) meaning is shown to be predicated on contextual cues, from the ‘outside’ 
text.  
This uncertainty of effect is further evidence of an irreducible tension between actual and 
virtual. When discussing the perceived actual – of which the novel’s most oft-occurring 
representation is war – Adam, and those around him, consistently appear to detach themselves 
to the safety of the virtual, making general pronouncements that have the potential to be made 
meaningful by the reader or listener. The status of war as ‘actual’ is therefore made ambiguous; 
rather than emphasising or decrying the gap that seems to exist between the virtuality of the 
speech act and the indefatigable reality of war, war is shown instead to be another object that 
can be discursively repurposed or appropriated. Following Mitchell’s statements on the lack of 
semantic difference between ekphrastic, descriptive and narrative forms of reference, war, or 
discursive reference to war, is equally flattened to the same dialectical tension between actual 
and virtual as other objects within the novel. This tension remains open to appropriation by 
either discourse; ‘war’ is both cited as actual and treated as virtual throughout the novel, while 
its signification is similarly dependent on the context of its utterance.  
Of course, while in the case of the Franco photograph the caption is a direct quote from 
Adam’s speech, the novel’s narrative is in first-person; all of the captions, therefore, are in some 
sense Adam’s words. Indeed, Adam calls attention to the slippage between thought and 
narration, often beginning extended sections with such statements as: ‘[t]his is what I felt, if it 
wasn’t what I thought’ (64). This further compounds the gap between caption and photograph: 
that the captions fail to clarify the illustration’s meaning is important; equally, the very fact that 
of their decontextualized recurrence is important in light of the emphasis on context and 
framing as essential elements of the hermeneutic process. The caption that accompanies the 
first illustration, the detail from the van der Weyden, is 'I thought of the great artist for a while.’ (11). 
This is a quote from far later in the discourse, when at the end of the novel’s third section 
Adam spends the night at the Ritz with Isabel, before waking to the aftermath of the 2004 
Madrid bombings (113). The contexts in which it appears are therefore significantly different. 
The knowledge of the original context does not negate the quote’s ambiguity; who the ‘great 
artist’ is remains unclear, though the term also occurs earlier, when Adam speculates about the 
identity of the man he sees crying in the Prado: 
Maybe this man is an artist, I thought; what if he doesn’t feel the transports he 
performs, what if the scenes he produces are intended to force the institution to 
face its contradiction in the person of these guards. […] I found myself following 
 
 
17 
this man, this great artist, out of the museum and into the preternaturally bright 
day. (10) 
Tracing the caption’s provenance in this way does not clarify its meaning; if indeed Adam is, 
later in the novel, referring back to this scene in the Prado, there is still the central issue of the 
quote’s appearance as a caption far before it occurs as part of a story event. In a novel that 
otherwise conforms quite strictly to a linear, forward-moving alignment of story and narrative 
discourse, this discrepancy, and that of the other photograph/caption relationships, stands out. 
If the caption’s purpose is to create a relationship between word and image that signifies, 
locating part of this joint signifier at a point in the discourse where it is inaccessible to the first-
time reader seems to undermine the relationship itself, or at least force it into one of 
retrospective enlightenment. This is especially significant in that it highlights the progression of 
narrative time itself: unlike in a non-fiction book, where such photographs or illustrations, and 
their captions, have a static meaning independent of the temporal relations within the text, here 
the entire text is predicated on development – of characters, of ideas, of concepts. Objects 
within the text are therefore shown to be not just context but time dependent; what is said 
about an object is not necessarily coherent at all points within the text. Rather than the 
photograph and caption functioning as a unit, the reference to ‘outside’ text instead emphasises 
the process of meaning deferral. The uncertainty surrounding the captions even when placed in 
the original context mean that even this does not result in a final, non-ambiguous meaning 
being ascribed to the photograph/caption relation. 
The text’s embedded images can also be figured in relation to Mitchell’s description of the 
difference between the verbal and visual as one predicated on presence. The art object, when 
understood as being of the visual, spatial, or plastic kind, is conventionally considered to be 
essentially present in the world in a way that the verbal can never be. In this sense, physical 
contact with the art object might therefore prompt the profound experience of art that is 
unavailable when the art object is apprehended visually. The haptic nature of the art object is 
emphasised in Leaving the Atocha Station: the motif of a child touching a painting recurs 
throughout, and Adam himself is drawn to touch a Picasso during his time in Barcelona:  
…there were two young kids, six or seven. I didn’t see the rest of the family. One 
walked up quickly to a large canvas and pawed it, clearly on a dare. Both kids ran 
out of the gallery, presumably back to their parents. There was no guard around. I 
approached the canvas the child had touched, a miniature precursor of, or study 
for, Les Demoiselles d’Avignon. I double-checked no one was around and, since the 
world was ending, touched the painting myself. (158) 
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This desire to come into physical contact with the art object is important, as it emphasises the 
perceived phenomenological difference between encountering an object in the ‘virtual’ world of 
the mental, and in the physical, material, and sensual world of the ‘actual’. Yet nothing comes 
from Adam’s touching the painting; the art object remains at a distance despite his physical 
contact with it. The emphasis on the physicality of the art object is further complicated by the 
inclusion of the photographs: the visual arts’ apparently more simple relation to the world – i.e. 
their being a part of the ‘actual’ through their spatial presence – is undermined by the fact that 
these photographs are located within another physical object: the book itself. Further, the 
photographs exist within the novel as reproductions: they are cropped (often dramatically, as in 
the case of the Descent detail), printed in grayscale and are, inevitably, of a poor quality. In some 
cases, this is pronounced: in the photograph of the bombing of Guernica, there are visible 
horizontal lines across the picture, a trace of the printing process and therefore of reproduction 
itself (52). Unlike the language of art criticism, which fictional discourse can simulate almost 
exactly, the photographs in the novel are clearly quite different objects from the originals they 
reproduce. We might therefore read the images as evincing the loss of aura Benjamin discusses, 
highlighting the inefficacy of reproductions as substitutes for the ‘actual’ art object. But this 
would be a mistake: while the referential distance seems to increase, the manner of the 
photographs’ inclusion within the text makes them physically commensurate with the 
surrounding discourse: both are printed, and both gesture towards an essentially absent object. 
As the recurrent reference to touching a painting suggests that there is no essential quality to 
the physical original, so too do the images evince a flattening of the hierarchy of the visual and 
textual, with regards to representative distance or mediation. The photographs and their 
captions therefore cannot be defined within the paradigm of the textual or the visual 
phenomenological encounter.  
The art object’s materiality continues to be a concern throughout the novel. In the aftermath of 
the bombings, Adam visits his friends Arturo and Teresa at their art gallery in Salamanca. The 
opening planned for that night has been cancelled; instead, at Adam’s suggestion, the paintings 
are to be covered with black cloth as a memorial, ‘a visual moment of silence’ (121). Yet 
covering the paintings in this way does not achieve the desired effect; rather than becoming 
moments of silence, the covered paintings themselves look ‘like contemporary art’, with their 
accompanying placards stating names and prices still uncovered (139). As in the case of Adam’s 
own gaps and silences, the covered paintings still signify, but this signification remains open. 
There is an obvious sense of cynicism here – both Adam and Teresa wonder whether any of the 
paintings will sell in their covered state – in that the performance of a ritualistic hiding of the art 
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object does not nullify, and perhaps even enhances, its status as a commodity (124). Yet the 
covered paintings also initiate an ontological line of thinking: if both the form and the content 
of the art object are obscured, the only thing which remains is the work’s objecthood itself – its 
presence in the world. In the case of the covered paintings, the space they occupy becomes the 
only ‘actual’ thing about them, yet they are still subject to a dependence on context. As ‘objects’, 
they are not somehow detached from signification through their new appearance, but still exist 
within a nexus of contextual cues for meaning-creation: the placards, importantly, and their 
location within the gallery environment itself. These elements are important in that they dictate 
in part any response to the objects as art, but it is equally important to consider how the 
phenomenological encounter that occurs with such an art object is altered in comparison to 
their pre-covered, representational state. The emphasised ‘objecthood’ of the contemporary art 
work changes the manner in which the spectator interacts with the work; Michael Fried’s well-
known theorising on ‘literalist’ (minimalist) art argues that such works distance the viewer – 
both physically and psychically – due to their ‘nonrelational, unitary character’, prescribing the 
relational dynamic as one where the viewer is the subject and the work is the object (Fried 154). 
Though this subject-object relationship seems typical of all human encounters with the visual or 
plastic art-object, Fried argues that this relational paradigm is imposed on the viewer in such a 
way that the encounter becomes one of theatricality, which, he writes, is the ‘negation of art’ 
(Fried 153). Theatricality is for Fried to do with an awareness of one’s own subject position, 
and therefore an awareness of perception and mediation itself. Objecthood and theatricality are, 
for Fried, thoroughly imbricated; the literalist sensibility is one in which the category of 
objecthood replaces, or at least vacillates between, painting and sculpture, with this material 
presence becoming the work’s only claim to a secure identity. As with his encounter with the 
van der Weyden, Adam’s response to the covered paintings belies an attention to the physicality 
of the thing itself, rather than any particular formal or representational features. Because the 
paintings are covered Adam becomes aware of the mediation of the art object – including 
wondering whether they will sell.  Again, then, an emphasis on the object position 
concomitantly results in its final accessibility being cast into question.   
This kind of subject-object relationship is treated with demonstrable ambiguity in the novel. 
Again, while it is possible to read a relationship of opposition into the categories of 
‘virtual’/subjective and ‘actual’/objective, Adam’s own encounters with art objects do not result 
in the privileging of either one category. This is consistent with other aspects of the novel. One 
of Adam’s key personality traits is that he lies to get attention: most conspicuously, he tells both 
Isabel and Teresa that his mother is dead, before ‘confessing’ that she is alive but unwell, living 
 
 
20 
with his ‘fascist’ father: ‘As I said this, I thought of my dad patiently trying to get a spider to 
crawl from the carpet onto a piece of paper so he could escort it safely from house to yard’ (86). 
In addition to this, after an instant message conversation with his friend Cyrus, Adam 
appropriates the story Cyrus tells him of witnessing a girl drowning in Mexico. A small part of 
Cyrus’s story concerns the aftermath of the drowning: 
CYRUS: […] A couple of people from the restaurant got in a car and went for 
them. And an old woman, she brought us some limes. 
ME: limes? 
CYRUS: She brought us two lime wedges and said something about the shock and 
that we should suck them and we did… (75) 
What seems like an insignificant detail – the old woman bringing the limes – is nevertheless 
repeated in Adam’s reproduction of the story to Isabel: 
I paused again, lighting a cigarette. Why was my Spanish so halting? “She did not 
know how to swim. She had bad luck and the current carried her. We followed her. 
We found the body in the river. I gave her”—here I touched my mouth and then 
gestured towards Isabel’s—“to make her breathe. But it was too late. We took her 
body to a place with phones. We called the police. An old woman gave us limes.” 
 “Limes,” Isabel confirmed. 
 “She gave us limes for sucking because we suffered shock.” 
 “My God,” Isabel said and took my hand. (95-96) 
Adam repeats the detail about the limes not because of its significance to the events he 
describes, though the extra veneer of detail does add a sense of truth-to-life. The limes, as 
material, sensual objects, anchor his narrative in the physical world. Yet the limes Adam cites 
are, of course, thoroughly of the virtual; he himself has never experienced them as physical 
objects. That a physical object could give the weight of the actual to the virtual is undermined: 
the categories of the virtual and actual are shown to be open to manipulation. Cyrus himself 
already suspects his girlfriend will repurpose the story herself in her novel. As with the 
ekphrastic mode earlier in the novel, the repetition of the limes demonstrates how all objects, 
artworks or otherwise, are essentially irreducible to both verbal representation and to thought. 
In a broader sense, then, the art objects described in the text represent a larger reconfiguration 
of the relation of object and subject as thought through the textual. Artistic configurations are, 
throughout the novel, referred to in relation to their objecthood and presence in the world, but 
rather than this physicality confirming the actual/virtual distinction it instead emphasises the 
irreducibility of the tension between them: objecthood in fact increases the potentiality of the 
virtual. This extends, or intersects with, the textual: Adam is a poet, and the novel contains two 
poems purportedly authored by him. The first is embedded in the discourse during Adam’s 
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appearance at a poetry reading (40). In a similar manner to the relationship between the 
embedded photographs and their captions, this poem poses a problem because it is made up 
completely of phrases from the surrounding narrative discourse: ‘Under the arc of the cello / I 
open the Lorca at random’, the poem’s opening lines, are found earlier in the narrative as Adam 
describes his poetic process of ‘translation’: 
I opened the Lorca more or less at random […] I looked up the Spanish word for 
the English word I wanted to replace, and then replaced that word with an English 
word that approximated its sound (“Under the arc of the sky” became “Under the 
arc of the cielo,” which became “Under the arc of the cello”). I then braided 
fragments of the prose I kept in my second notebook with the translations I had 
thus produced (“Under the arc of the cello / I open the Lorca at random,” and so 
on). (16) 
Again, the relationship of the narrative discourse to the art object within it is ambiguous. It 
would be impossible to locate which came first – the poem or the novel – because of the 
virtuality – the fictionality – of the whole. The second poem in the text further complicates 
matters due to its existence in the ‘real’ world outside the novel: Adam reads the poem in a ‘tiny 
magazine published in New York’, a copy of which he had given to Teresa (127). As with the 
first poem, this work is embedded into the text, and, again, it contains phrases that can be 
found in the surrounding discourse: the poem’s final lines, ‘I have never been here. / 
Understand? / You have never seen me’, are found towards the end of the novel, slightly 
changed: ‘I have never been here, I said to myself. You have never seen me’ (128, 178). The 
poem’s ambiguity is compounded, however, because it exists as an object in the world outside 
of Leaving the Atocha Station: Lerner published the poem in his collection The Lichtenberg Figures in 
2004, the year in which the events of Leaving the Atocha Station take place. While the attribution 
of the poem’s authorship is thus complicated, a more significant effect of this real-world 
existence is that, like the ekphrastic mode and the presence of the photographs, it forges a 
connection to the supposed material, non-textual world ‘outside’ of the novel that is not simply 
deferral, in the manner of classic poststructuralism. Rather than increasing connection to the 
actual – seeking the ‘real’, as James Wood might put it – such devices instead highlight the lack 
of an actual, accessible object in the world outside the text.  
In addition to the two poems ‘written’ by Adam, Leaving the Atocha Station also contains much 
consideration of the poem as an abstract thing. Poetry is constantly referred to within the novel 
as being obsolete – despite Adam’s status as poet – due to its inherent virtuality. While at the 
aforementioned poetry reading, Adam is preceded by a Spanish poet, Tomás, whose work he 
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describes as ‘an Esperanto of clichés’, but which – unexpectedly, to Adam’s mind – seems to 
move the audience: 
If people were in fact moved, convincing themselves they discovered whatever they 
projected into the hackneyed poem, or better yet, if people felt the pressure to 
perform absorption in the face of what they knew was an embarrassing placeholder 
for an art no longer practicable for whatever reasons, a dead medium whose former 
power could be felt only as a loss—these scenarios did for me involve a pathos the 
actual poems did not, a pathos that in fact increased in proportion to their failure, 
as the more abysmal the experience of the actual the greater the implied heights of 
the virtual. (38) 
The suggestion here is that the relation between actual and virtual is not so much dialectical as 
oscillatory – as the actual withdraws, the virtual expands to fill the gap it leaves. Compare, 
though, Adam’s conception of poetry earlier in the novel:  
Poetry actively repelled my attention, it was opaque and thingly and refused to 
absorb me…and yet by refusing to absorb me the poem held out the possibility of 
a higher form of absorption of which I was unworthy, a profound experience 
unavailable from within the damaged life, and so the poem became a figure for its 
outside. (20) 
In this sense, the poem as object is both actual – ‘thingly’ – and virtual. As in the case of the 
covered paintings, the contextual cues –the fact that the poem is itself an art object – mean that 
the reader or spectator begins the hermeneutic process with an assumption of referential 
capacity. This dependence on context, though, means that as the poem becomes increasingly 
abstract and refuses to easily yield meaning it becomes, to the reader ‘opaque’ and ‘thingly’. In 
other words, rather than projecting towards the spectator as in Fried’s schema of the object, the 
poem’s objecthood causes it to withdraw from the reader, simultaneously becoming increasingly 
dependent on the ability of the reader to correctly interpret ‘outside’ texts in order to find 
meaning while signalling the impossibility of accessing the object itself. The connection 
between abstraction and ‘thingliness’ therefore parallels the dialectic of virtual and actual, in that 
it is in the intersection of the concepts that experience is located. The relationship between 
subject and object, then, is one of constant projection, regardless of the level of presence the 
object reveals.  
In the above quote, Adam’s direct reference to Adorno – the ‘damaged life’ – is significant, as 
there are clear parallels between Adorno’s concepts and the schema implied in Leaving the Atocha 
Station. Taken from the subtitle to Minima Moralia, the idea of the ‘damaged life’ is key to 
understanding Adorno’s criticism as whole. Adorno’s concern as a critical theorist is not to 
provide an account of what the ‘good life’ would be like, but to examine what the present, 
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‘damaged life’ is like (Jarvis 9). Adorno therefore rejects the idea of a theory that seeks an 
‘outside’ perspective from which to critique. This immanent critique is in contrast to both 
György Lukács and Benjamin – each of whom are, of course, enormously influential on 
Adorno’s thought – who argue for, respectively, a totalising mode of criticism based on the 
revolutionary praxis of the proletariat, and a recourse to the ‘higher domain’ of theology (Jarvis 
8-10).7 Such a major difference in approach requires some unpacking in order for its 
significance – and relevance – to be made clear. 
Adorno’s thought coalesces around the formulation of ‘a critical thinking without 
transcendental method’, that is, a philosophical materialism (Jarvis 148). It is this that results in 
his negative dialectic, and which distinguishes it from the Hegelian dialectic – which, as Adorno 
conceptualises it, remains within the tradition of German idealism in that it still posits access to 
an ‘absolute truth’ (Jarvis 16). The object cannot be translated into thought, thus the negative 
dialectic ‘respects that which is to be thought—the object—even where the object does not 
heed the rules of thinking’ (Adorno Negative 141). Adorno is equally suspicious, though, of any 
theory that attempts to break with previous modes of thought, as to do so would mean thought 
would become detached from history, and therefore destined to repeat the ‘dialectic of 
enlightenment’. The idea of the negative dialectic, then, is not to provide an inversion of a 
currently ‘positive’ dialectic, but to demonstrate that truly dialectical thought is already negative 
in character (Jarvis 168). This ‘negativity’ is derived from the fact that when seen in opposition 
to identity thinking – the mode of thought that defines the object by categorisation – the 
negative dialectic does not attempt a new mode of thought, but instead demonstrates the 
insufficiency of the present, inescapably identificatory, one. This is what is meant by a reflection 
on the ‘damaged life’: according to Adorno, criticism may only discuss the condition of the 
present – the damaged life – as to do otherwise would be to fall into the mode of contemplative 
reinforcement of the present (Lukács) or transcendental method (Benjamin).  
As a concept, then, the negative dialectic functions non-productively. Rather than assuming the 
primacy of the subject over the object, Adorno argues that the subject is essentially dependent 
on the object: the object remains when a subject (human or otherwise) is absent, but the subject 
position can only ever occur in relation to something external to it (Adorno Negative 141). This 
leads Adorno to his conception of the identity and non-identity of the object: stated reductively, 
                                                
7 Relations between Adorno and Lukács and Adorno and Benjamin are too wide-ranging to give an overview of 
here, and Adorno does refer to both theorists at length in his work. The classic text in which Adorno and 
Benjamin respond to one another is Aesthetics and Politics; for a brief overview of the relationship between Adorno 
and Lukács’s aesthetic thought, see Timothy Hall’s “Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory and Lukács’s Theory of the 
Novel” in Adorno and Literature.  
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an object’s ‘identity’ is what the subject can identify about it – its ‘dimensions’ and ‘blues’, for 
example. Adorno’s theory is significant here in connecting such identification with the idea of 
exchange value, or the formulation of the object’s equivalence to other objects. In contrast, the 
object’s ‘non-identity’ is the ever-present gap in the subject’s attempt to identify; it is what 
causes the object to resist being enmeshed in a network of exchange. This non-identity is not 
directly accessible to the subject, hence it forms the basis of the negative dialectic: a thinking 
against thought wherein the subject resists the attempt to identify, and thereby reduce, the 
object. As Adorno states: ‘To proceed dialectically means to think in contradictions, for the sake 
of the contradiction once experienced in the thing, and against that contradiction’ (Adorno 
Negative 144-145). Adorno does not argue that such a dialectic will finally provide a synthesis, 
but that it will solely provide an account of the insufficiency of current thought. In the case of 
Leaving the Atocha Station, then, Adorno’s negative dialectic is useful in providing a theoretical 
basis for the idea of the ‘non-identical’, inaccessible aspect of the object: the novel is significant 
in finding this inaccessibility in all objects, whether haptic and material or ‘virtual’.  
While there is strong evidence for reading such a parallel in the novel, the question remains: 
why refer at such length to Adorno here? Such theoretical intertextuality is not in itself unique, 
especially within contemporary literature. Employing the work of a theorist who wrote and 
thought in a historical moment quite removed from the context of the production of the text at 
hand runs the risk of removing both theory and novel from history completely. Yet the 
references to critical theory in Leaving the Atocha Station are not simply evidence of the education 
of the protagonist, nor do they function solely as interpretive cues. Consider, for instance, 
Adam’s numerous paraphrases of Lukács. During a winter spent mostly in his apartment, Adam 
wonders: 
…if the incommensurability of language and experience was new, if my experience 
of my experience issued from a damaged life of pornography and privilege, if there 
were happy ages when the starry sky was the map of all possible paths, or if this 
division of experience into what could not be named and what could not be lived 
just was experience, for all people for all time. (65) 
This easy reference to major critical theorists is, of course, evidence of Adam’s carefully 
constructed persona of the ‘serious’ poet, but it would be a mistake to read it as solely that. The 
adoption of critical discourse is, as in the earlier reflection on the van der Weyden, unattributed. 
Adam is quoting, here, but there is no indication of this within the discourse itself: neither 
Lukács nor Adorno are mentioned by name at any point in the novel. This is important: Adam’s 
‘voice’, such as it is, incorporates such discourse fluently; it would be easy to assume that these 
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are his words, and to some extent the lack of direct citation means that they are his words. Of 
course, it would therefore be possible to parse the passage as further evincing Adam’s 
disconnect from the ‘real’ world and subsequent flight into the abstraction of theory, but as 
consideration of the other objects in the novel has shown, this distinction does not always hold. 
The reference to Lukács is important here because of its subject matter: Lukács’s ‘happy ages’ 
of the epic refers to a speculative time in which language and the world were commensurate, 
during which, significantly, there would be no need for philosophical or theoretical 
contemplation (Lukács Novel 29). Adam follows Lukács in ascribing to his present moment the 
impossibility of its representation – whether that be textual, visual, or critical – framing this 
impossibility not simply as one of language, but of the relationship between subject and world. 
Critical theory therefore becomes not a flight from the world, but an essential part of the 
experience of it, when the world is understood as being essentially inaccessible. Theory, like the 
photographs or the poems, is part of an attempt at communion with the materiality of the 
present, a materiality whose primary characteristic is its non-identicality, its refusal to be directly 
identified or experienced by the subject. 
Thus far, I have been using the terms ‘thing’ and ‘object’ interchangeably in reference to the art 
objects present – or present to some (virtual) degree – in the novel. This lack of distinction, 
however, is perhaps misleading. ‘Object’ as a term implies a specificity which ‘thing’ does not; 
further, while philosophy is accustomed to understanding the ‘object’ as signifying, this is not 
the case for the ‘thing’. Bill Brown’s introduction to ‘Thing Theory’ is useful here: 
As they circulate through our lives, we look through objects (to see what they 
disclose about history, society, nature, or culture—above all, what they disclose 
about us), but we only catch a glimpse of things. We look through objects because 
there are codes by which our interpretive attention makes them meaningful, 
because there is a discourse of objectivity that allows us to use them as facts. A thing 
in contrast, can hardly function as a window. (Brown 4) 
Materialism, in the case of the object, refers to an essentially semiotic process; the object is used 
as a site for hermeneutics. In contrast, the ‘thingness’ of an object – what Fried might call its 
objecthood – only becomes subject to attention when it stops functioning as we have come to 
expect – ‘when the drill breaks, when the car stalls, when the windows get filthy’, or, perhaps, 
when the painting is covered (Brown 4). Yet as Brown continues, ‘thing’ also denotes a kind of 
amorphousness; it is ‘concrete yet ambiguous’, functioning ‘to overcome the loss of other 
words or as a place holder for some future specifying operation’ (Brown 4-5). Here, then, the 
connection to Adam’s categories of virtual and actual becomes more apparent: if the thingness 
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of an object is part of both its objecthood and its virtuality, so too is the virtual a category of 
both potentiality and materialism.     
Despite the embedded photographs and poems, then, there is no recourse to a final materiality 
within Leaving the Atocha Station. The photographs are reminders of the thingness of the art 
object, but the ambiguous nature of their relationship to the surrounding text makes it 
impossible to consider them as wholly of the material world. This liminality is gestured towards 
throughout the novel. During the aforementioned winter, Adam is keenly aware of how the 
uneventful forward motion of his lived experience would be impossible to translate into 
narrative: 
These periods of rain or periods between rains in which I was smoking and reading 
Tolstoy would be, I knew impossible to narrate, and that impossibility entered the 
experience: the particular texture of my loneliness derived in part from my sense 
that I could only share it, could only describe it, as pure transition […] But this 
account ascribed the period a sense of directionality, however slight or slow, made 
it a vector between events, when in fact the period was dilated, detached, strangely 
self-sufficient, but that’s not really right. (63-64) 
What enters Adam’s thinking here is the concept of duration: of how time affects and effects 
things in the world. Adam continues: ‘[d]uring this period all like periods of my life were called 
forth to form a continuum, or at least a constellation’, the latter term important for its 
provenance in critical theory (64). Conceived by Benjamin, the ‘constellation’ as later borrowed 
by Adorno represents ‘a juxtaposed rather than integrated cluster of changing elements that 
resist reduction to a common denominator, essential core, or generative first principle’ (Jay 14-
15). The use of ‘constellation’ here again emphasises the inaccessibility of the non-identical; in 
connecting the idea of time to the idea of the constellation, the implication is that it is not just 
the materiality of the object, but its presence in both space and time, which accounts for the 
complexity of the phenomenological encounter the spectator has with it. Constellations, as 
employed by Adorno, are ‘nothing in themselves’ but relations ‘between (necessarily time-
bound) particulars’ which might allow a glimpse of the non-identical, an illumination of the 
specificity of the individual thing (Jarvis 176-177). Adam’s account of his life’s duration 
demonstrates an understanding of what he identifies as the ‘constellation’ as itself being life, 
with events themselves, ‘sharply localized occurrences in time’, being ‘mere ligaments’ (64). 
These events, he continues, cannot be represented accurately because of their conventionality – 
they are, in his words, ‘ready-made literature’ – and yet the constellation itself is not 
representable because it is nothing in itself. Following Adorno, then, it becomes possible to 
understand these ‘events’ as ‘time-bound’ concepts, while duration itself becomes the 
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constellation. Representing the concept in itself (i.e. the non-identical) is always impossible 
because of the inherent inescapability of identity-thinking; as Adam says, such concepts as the 
‘kiss’ or ‘concussion’ cannot be understood in themselves as they are always already thought 
through conceptuality. Yet the negative dialectic is not able to offer any way out of this 
representational inadequacy: it can only demonstrate the insufficiency of one mode of thought, 
can only reflect on the ‘damaged life’ as it presently exists.  
These ‘time-bound particulars’ – the concepts whose relations form the constellation itself – are 
important, in that the entire schema must be understood as being in motion; Adorno does not 
think that concepts can remain fixed unless they are empty. If the concepts are not fixed, 
however, the problem in understanding the constellation comes in accounting for how such a 
schema can be cognized as differing from the transcendental schema Adorno rejects. There is 
much to be said on Adorno’s interlocution of the transcendental schema in Kant; in essence, 
however, Adorno rejects Kant’s appeal to the transcendental because he believes that to admit a 
philosophy which does not allow the subject to have any knowledge of the object, except for 
what appears to the subjective consciousness, is essentially a kind of scepticism. In other words, 
Kant argues that we can only know objects phenomenally, though we can think of a thing 
‘considered as it is itself’ (Jarvis 182). Adorno argues that this schema is unintelligible, as for the 
subject to think of the thing ‘in itself’ it must have knowledge of such an essence existing ‘beyond 
appearances’, yet this very knowledge of the essence would surely imply that it had in fact 
appeared to the subject (Jarvis 182). Adorno argues instead for a ‘priority of the object’; that is, 
the object as independent of the subject and its conceptuality, though he maintains that 
immediate access to the object, outside of conceptuality, would not be possible, as this would 
always be mediated by the subject’s consciousness. Yet while such a priority seemingly implies a 
recourse to materialism, Adorno again rejects this, claiming that such a schema implies that the 
object itself is an ‘invariant ground’ rather than something mutable and in flux.  
To clarify the nature of a subject-object relation predicated on movement, it is worth returning 
to Lukács. As discussed, his Theory of the Novel centres on the notion of immanence, of a 
commensurability of subject and object. In contrast to the epic’s ‘happy ages’ of subject-object 
coevality, the novel is the form of ‘absolute sinfulness’: a categorisation (inherited from Fichte) 
that does not necessarily imply a moral judgement but instead signifies a kind of relational 
dynamic, or ‘perspective’, between subject and world (Lukács Novel 152). As described by 
Timothy Bewes: 
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The novel is the form of ‘absolute sinfulness’ not because of any moral or historical 
decline, but simply because of this principle of interiority, the principle that creates 
and maintains the ‘chasm’ between self and world, condemning the novel to 
abstraction, reflexivity, pontification, irony or utopianism. (Bewes Escape 40) 
This subjective perspective, predicated on interiority, is therefore implicit in the novel; it is also 
what makes the form so problematic for Lukács. Towards the end of the Theory of the Novel, this 
inherent division between subject and world is contrasted with the suggestion of a ‘new world’ 
where such perspectival relationships cease to exist. Here Lukács parallels Adorno’s conception 
of the ‘damaged life’ in arguing that the ‘new world’ cannot be represented as this would itself 
involve a perspectival configuration of subject to world. There thus seems to be a kind of 
vanishing point or aporia for critical inquiry at this point. As Bewes points out, however, the 
very suggestion of a ‘new world’ apart from such perspectival relationships in The Theory of the 
Novel is preceded by the description of the cinematic medium in the early essay “Thoughts 
Toward an Aesthetic of the Cinema” (Bewes Escape 42). The essay is explicitly concerned with 
the relationship between the cinematic image and its represented object(s); importantly, 
however, Lukács is not concerned with the representational distance between cinematic image 
and object, but with the fact that cinema seems to offer an escape from such questions 
altogether (Bewes Escape 41).  
One of the key elements of Lukács’s cinema essay is his description of the ‘essence’ of cinema: 
this, he states, is ‘movement itself, an eternal variability, the never-resting change of things’ 
(Lukács Cinema 15). This sense of movement and change is predicated on the ‘unlimited 
possibility’ cinema offers; rather than the sequence of shots being bound by causality, shots are 
connected only in that ‘they follow one another, immediately and without transition’ (Lukács 
Cinema 15). It is in this condition of possibility that cinema differs most concretely from the 
novel; as Lukács figures, in cinema, ‘everything is true and real, is equally true and equally real’ 
(Lukács Cinema 15). Whether cinema was or is finally able to offer such a condition is of little 
relevance here; what is important, however, is the utopian potential Lukács identifies in the 
medium, a potential that is wholly predicated on its treatment of time. It might seem, of course, 
that Lukács’s account of cinema is paradoxical: if the ‘new world’ cannot be depicted or else 
become enmeshed in the network of representational exchange it is supposed to overcome, 
how is cinema able to offer such a utopian vision in the present moment of its existence? The 
key here is that cinema, for Lukács, does not attempt to represent life at all; as he argues, the 
cinematic image means, ‘only movements and actions of people – but no people’ (Lukács Cinema 
14). Rather than being an alternative to present life, Lukács figures cinema as an ‘aspect’ of the 
same life, 
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…a life without the present, a life without fate, without reasons, without motives, a 
life without measure or order, without essence or value, a life without soul, of pure 
surface, a life with which the innermost of our soul does not want to coincide; nor 
can it […] The world of the “cinema” is thus a world without background or 
perspective, without any difference in weight or quality, as only the present gives 
things fate and weight, light and lightness (Lukács Cinema 14) 
Interiority – subjectivity – is what produces a perspectival relationship; rather than a ‘new 
world’, then, it is perhaps more accurate to characterise Lukács’s vision as a revolutionary 
transformation of the subject position itself. The gesture towards a world in which the subject is 
coeval with the object equals a situation in which, ‘[m]an has lost his soul; in return, however, he 
gains his body’ (Lukács Cinema 16). This latter emphasis on the body thus suggests a subject-
world relation in which the interiority of the subject is sacrificed for the ‘sensory immediacy’ of 
the cinematic image, or as Lukács later figures it, the epic (Bewes Escape 46). Subject-object 
relations in Lukács are therefore based in sensual experience rather than representation.  
Lukács’s work on cinema is finally useful, then, in expanding the definition of what the world of 
the ‘epic’ might actually feel like. More than just a utopian vision of a world in which ‘the fire 
that burns in the soul is of the same essential nature as the stars’, the world of the epic – which 
I have here, following Bewes, conflated with the cinematic medium – is one in which form is 
interlocuted according to its sensual qualities (Lukács Novel 29). The immanent properties of the 
novel as a formal and technical category – rather than the perspectival relationship it has to the 
world it represents – must be commensurate with the sensory experience of the world; it is not 
that representational distance must be reduced to the point of indistinguishability, but that the 
question of representation itself must be replaced by a formal coevality between the novel and 
the ‘outside’ world. Cinema, then, is useful in offering a glimpse of how this mode might be 
figured, but in Lukács’s later work, what becomes clear is the extent to which such a 
transformation must be predicated on, to use Bewes’s words, ‘the insight that language, too, is a 
‘mechanical’ apparatus, as ‘seared’ by reality as the photographic image’ (Bewes Escape 47).  
If we understand Lukács’s essay on cinema as adumbrating a formal mode or category whose 
defining character is its condition of possibility, it becomes clear that the temporal (or 
durational) logic of the cinematic image is immensely useful when brought into dialogue with 
narratological analysis of the novel itself. As previously stated, the art objects in Lerner’s novel 
serve in part to disrupt and draw attention to the duration of narrative time: photographs are 
captioned with quotes from as yet unread parts of the discourse, and duration itself is discussed 
through reference to the textual or cinematic media through which it might be reconstructed. 
Lukács’s conception of cinema is of particular interest because it is predicated on an 
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understanding of time that differs from the conventional understanding of story progression; its 
‘unlimited possibility’ is due to the ability of each individual shot to exist independently. Yet this 
conception of cinema seems somewhat lacking. If cinema is at least in part a narrative medium 
– a contention which, to my mind, does not seem subject to debate – then this is surely 
predicated on exactly the kind of connection between images – the ‘temporal sequence’ – that 
Lukács identifies as defining the novel mode itself. There seems to be no essential difference 
between the nature of cinematic time as conceived in Lukács and the nature of novelistic time 
as evinced by Lerner; both media seem capable of producing narratives that are made coherent 
only through the necessarily singular temporal direction of their experience. In light of the 
novel’s disruption of medium specificity, it makes more sense to understand the 
cinematic/novelistic time distinction as based not on medium but on a way of perceiving and 
understanding time. This argument does not negate the above discussion of what Lukács 
conceived in the cinematic medium, but it does bring into question what the essential ontological 
difference between cinematic and novelistic time might be, a question that is important to 
consider in light of Leaving the Atocha Station’s concern with duration itself. 
Perhaps, then, it will prove useful to compare Lukács’s largely ignored essay on cinema with 
Gilles Deleuze’s enormously influential Cinema books. Rather than critiquing one theorist 
through the lens of the other, a more useful paradigm for engagement is to bring both into a 
dialogue while remaining conscious of the extremity of difference existing between the 
historical moments of their writing. Deleuze’s comprehension of cinema as a medium is 
influenced by the huge amount of cinematic texts available to him; Lukács, in contrast, was 
writing much earlier and thus his essay makes some arguments that seem untenable today:  
The “cinema” presents mere action but no motive or meaning. […] It is for this 
reason – and only apparently due to the present day imperfections of technique – 
that the scenes of the cinema are silent. The spoken word, the sounding concept, 
are vehicles of fate, only in them and through them arises the binding continuity in 
the psyche of the dramatic character. (Lukács Cinema 15) 
Language is here identified as the element which enforces linear temporality – that is, 
conventional, novelistic forward movement. Again we see in Lukács a separation of cinematic 
and novelistic narration; it is helpful, then, to refer to Deleuze for an alternative way to 
conceptualise this difference. Deleuze’s most pressing distinction is not between cinema and 
novel or silence and speech; his Cinema books are predicated on a divide he calls the 
‘sensorimotor break’, which marks a division between the classical cinema of the ‘movement-
image’ and the ‘time-image’ of the modern. While the nature of this break is never wholly 
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clarified, the distinction Deleuze draws here is important in that it is not solely theoretical, but 
can be found in aesthetic praxis. Rather than conceiving of cinema as a whole, the 
‘sensorimotor break’ allows the problem outlined with Lukács’s argument above to perhaps be 
overcome, or at least avoided, by Deleuze. Unlike Lukács (and Adorno), Deleuze does not offer 
a totalising theory of immanence without representation, but identifies a particular kind of 
aesthetic configuration – the cinema of the time-image – that itself gestures towards a non-
perspectival relationship between actual and virtual.  
Deleuze defines two categories of cinema: the movement-image and the time-image. The 
difference between these images lies in the different ways they apprehend the actual and virtual. 
The time-image culminates in the crystal-image – a shot that occupies a unique place in space 
and time through its virtuality: the virtual, for Deleuze, refers to the interpenetration of past and 
future through the present. The crystal-image is necessarily complex; essentially, it emphasises 
the indivisible unity, or what D.N. Rodowick describes as the ‘indiscernibility’, of the virtual and 
actual image (Rodowick 92). It is a portrait of duration in the sense that Bergson, from whom 
Deleuze draws his theory of time, defines it: ‘Pure duration is the form taken by the succession 
of our inner states of consciousness when our self lets itself live, when it abstains from 
establishing a separation between the present state and anterior states’ (Bergson 100). In this 
context, the distinction between actual and virtual is based on description, as Rodowick 
continues, ‘the actual refers to the states of things – the physical and the real – as described in 
space through perception. The virtual is subjective, that is, mental and imaginary, sought out in 
time through memory’ (Rodowick 92). Deleuze again inherits much here from Bergson, whose 
own argument centres around the notion that there is no difference between interior and 
exterior, subject and object – that both are simply ‘systems of images’, interacting with each 
other in a ‘perceptual and/or epistemological event’ (Rodowick 30). Though the Bergson-
Deleuze encounter is not predicated on a subject without interiority, as in Lukács, the subject 
position outlined is one in which the virtual is formally congruent with the ‘actual’: both are 
systems of images that can interact with one another in an ‘event’. It is important to note, 
however, that the crystal-image description can rarely be applied to an entire film; for Deleuze, 
while many films contain the crystal-image or variations of it, this usually applies only to a single 
shot. The crystal-image as a category therefore remains somewhat speculative, despite its basis 
in aesthetic praxis.  
The crystal-image is therefore of essential importance in understanding how Deleuze might be 
meaningfully discussed in relation to Lukács’s configuration. If the subject-world (and text-
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world) relation must be one of formal and technical congruence, the time-image seems to be 
the only realised aesthetic category in either theorist’s work in which such a relation might be 
achieved without a concomitant descent into referential paradox (as discussed by Adorno and 
Lukács on separate occasions). In order to understand how Deleuze’s direct image of time 
might prove productive in discussion with Leaving the Atocha Station, it is first necessary to 
consider what, according to Deleuze, precedes it: the movement-image or the ‘organic regime’ 
(Deleuze 126). The movement-image consists of action and reaction in a spatial rather than a 
temporal sense. The key difference is therefore between each image’s relation to, or 
understanding of, the object it represents: 
A description which assumes the independence of its object will be called ‘organic’. 
It is not a matter of knowing if the object is really independent, it is not a matter of 
knowing if these are exteriors or scenery. What counts is that, whether they are 
scenery or exteriors, the setting described is presented as independent of the 
description which the camera gives of it, and stand for a supposedly pre-existing 
reality. In contrast, what we will call a crystalline description stands for its object, 
replaces it, both creates and erases it – as Robbe-Grillet puts it – and constantly 
gives way to other descriptions which contradict, displace, or modify the preceding 
ones. It is now the description itself which constitutes the sole decomposed and 
multiplied object. (Deleuze 126) 
While this concern with representation might seem in contrast to Lukács, the very usefulness of 
Deleuze lies in the predication of the sensorimotor break on a difference not just of 
representational distance or adequacy, but in the mode or type of image-world relation. What 
Deleuze identifies in the movement-image is its conventional relation to the world, and to time. 
Taken as an ontological category rather than a cinematic technique, the movement-image 
assumes a prior objective world that can be represented – to whatever degree of accuracy – in 
art or discourse. Such a category, when applied to narrative, means understanding the story and 
narrative discourse distinction as functioning in a single direction; story need not precede 
narrative, but can be extracted from narrative and pieced together by the reader or viewer to 
form a coherent whole. The movement-image might therefore be equated with a classical 
understanding of the novel form: time can only be registered through the sequential (forward) 
movement of events – ‘event’ here meaning an action, rather than the Bergsonian concept 
defined above. In contrast, the time-image is a condition of constant production: neither story 
nor discourse can be understood as prior, but are instead indiscernible and constantly 
developing.  
Towards the end of Leaving the Atocha Station, Adam visits Barcelona with Teresa. At one point, 
they discuss Antonioni’s film The Passenger – Teresa draws a comparison between Adam and 
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herself and the characters of Jack Nicholson and Maria Schneider. Teresa describes the film’s 
iconic final shot to Adam – who has not seen the film, but pretends he has – before going on to 
talk more about films, seemingly without Adam’s involvement: 
…Teresa talked about films, almost none of which I knew; maybe because we’d 
seen Orpheus, a movie about fluid boundaries, earlier that day, or because we were 
suddenly and impulsively arrived in a new city, or maybe because the bar was like a 
cave, I projected images to accompany her speech. Teresa appeared in those 
images, entered the films she was describing, and soon the films collapsed into one 
film, and it was her life I was imagining. She didn’t so much recount plots as shots 
and sequences as though they were plots. I pictured her at various ages and at the 
center of each scene, as if she had organized it around herself, and this struck me as 
a higher form of biography than the mere detailing of events. (153) 
This ‘higher form of biography’ is one in which the formal features of the medium are 
commensurate with the represented object; the technical categories of ‘shots and sequences’ 
replace the conventional narrative mode of the representation of a series of events. It is 
significant, in a novel so concerned with the ‘damaged life’, and the impossibility of 
representing the ‘new world’, that what occurs here seems to be a very specific description of an 
aesthetic category that is coeval with its object. Of course, this form exists only within Adam’s 
imagination; the form of the novel dictates that such a mode might be thought or glimpsed, but 
never wholly realised. 
In Leaving the Atocha Station, the limits of the novel mode mean that the kind of ‘new world’ 
thought by Lukács, or the Deleuzian crystal-image can only be gestured towards. The novel’s 
final lines come while Adam is at the launch of a chapbook of his poetry: 
Arturo appeared at the podium and began to speak. Night-blooming flowers 
refused to open near the stadium lights. Freedom was on the march. Aircraft noise 
was having strange effects on finches. Some species synchronized their flashes, 
sometimes across thousands of insects, exacerbating contradictions. Why was I 
born between mirrors? 
 Teresa would read the originals and I would read the translations and the 
translations would become the originals as we read. Then I planned to live forever 
in a skylit room surrounded by my friends. (181) 
In the final paragraph Adam again imagines an interpenetration and indiscernibility of past and 
present, actual and virtual. The idealism – even utopianism – in the final sentence is obvious. In 
the preceding sentences the insistence on dialectical configurations is also clear: the 
synchronicity that serves to exacerbate ‘contradictions’; the ‘born between mirrors’ line (itself a 
repetition: the line is from Lorca, and first appears in the original Spanish two pages earlier); 
 
 
34 
and, of course, the imagined simultaneity of original and translation.8 Yet these concepts, in 
remaining both dialectical and idealist, can finally only act as a suggestion of something of 
which the novel form is itself incapable. If Deleuze’s movement-image can be thought of as 
congruent with the depiction of time in the novel, the time- and crystal-images must therefore 
be thought of as an alternative category of text-world relation that, despite the specificity 
implied by its description in the Cinema books, remains impossible to realise in full. While 
modern cinema might offer glimpses of the direct image of time, Deleuze argues that very few 
films extend this beyond the individual shot or sequence. As in the other configurations of 
subject-world relation discussed – Adorno’s negative dialectics and constellations; Lukács’s 
categories of the ‘epic’ and ‘new world’ – the situation of the text in its own historical moment 
means that all such imagining remains just that. Through continually positing a dialectical 
relation between text and object, subject and world, ‘actual’ and ‘virtual’, Leaving the Atocha 
Station finally suggests an overcoming of considerations of representation and perspective. Yet 
this gesture does not make the novel idealist or utopian in character. While the continued 
gesturing towards a configuration that is unachievable within the context of the textual medium 
must necessarily be understood as idealist, such gestures also demonstrate the recognition of the 
limitations of the novel form itself. As the constellation might offer glimpses of the non-
identical, rather than attempting to perform within the novel the ideal subject-world relation 
Leaving the Atocha Station makes reference to its absence through both content, and, perhaps 
more significantly, through form. 
 
                                                
8 To Lorca, compare Rodowick on the crystalline-image: ‘Like an image produced in a mirror, it always has two poles: actual and virtual’ 
(Rodowick 92).  
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The Sensuous Presence of the Thing: Infinite Jest 
 
If Leaving the Atocha Station can be broadly construed as a novel of determinate negation, in 
which the embedded art objects and ekphrases consistently gesture towards the impossibility 
of accessing the object completely, I want here to outline a schema in which the opposite is 
the case. This chapter is concerned with how the representation of art objects in a literary text 
might serve to undermine, rather than reinforce, aspects of the novel’s form and content. 
David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest, while being superficially very different from Lerner’s novel 
– it is approximately six times longer, with a non-linear, third-person narrative focalised 
through a number of different characters – provides a productive contrast. Despite their 
myriad stylistic differences, in both novels the embedded art object can be placed under 
greater heuristic scrutiny than if it were simply providing a veneer of detail, or evincing a 
particular kind of metafictional recursion. The embedded art objects of both novels have in 
common a relation to the surrounding text that reveals how the novel as a whole is conceived 
as relating to the world. Yet, as I will argue, despite their shared investment in the art object, 
Wallace’s novel does differ from Lerner’s in deeply significant ways. These differences are 
apparent not just on the level of form or content, but in the aesthetic assumptions on which 
each novel is predicated. The representation of art objects therefore provides a productive 
spectrum through which to focus on and analyse subject-object relations on an internal level, 
and to investigate whether these relations are consistent with the novel as an art object itself.  
A key point of difference between the ekphrastic mode in Leaving the Atocha Station and Infinite 
Jest is in the relative fictionality of its objects. Lerner’s novel describes artworks of various 
media – painting, photography, film – including those which exist outside the novel and those 
that are purely fictional (as well as complicating the provenance of others, such as Adam’s 
poetry). The novel also includes visual art objects – reproductions of photographs and film 
stills – alongside the more conventional ekphrastic passages. In contrast, in Infinite Jest the art 
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objects described are almost exclusively fictional.9 This places a particular pressure on the 
question of aesthetics as the  text itself becomes the only point of access for the reader. In this 
sense, the art objects of Infinite Jest – despite initially seeming less complex than those 
described in Leaving the Atocha Station – pose a challenge to critical analysis of the novel: it is 
important here to remain focused on how the art objects are figured through ekphrasis, rather 
than only speculating as to what they might look like outside of the novel. In what follows, 
then, I want to outline how Infinite Jest’s concern with the art object reveals that the novel’s 
position on the relation between subject and object is itself contradictory. Through returning 
to the critical apparatus already developed – particularly the work of Adorno and Deleuze – 
the aesthetic and metaphysical assumptions on which Infinite Jest is based can be extrapolated 
and analysed in relation to the text of the novel itself.  
In Infinite Jest, the clearest examples of ekphrasis are filmic. If the term ekphrasis refers to the 
verbal representation of the visual, the textual representation of cinema can thus be described 
as ekphrastic because – like the more traditional painting, sculpture, or objet d’art – cinema is 
non-textual. Perhaps more so than with other media, however, the representation of cinema 
seems to be inescapably subject to Mitchell’s ‘ekphrastic indifference’, that is, ‘the 
commonsense perception that ekphrasis is impossible’ (Mitchell 151) While Leaving the Atocha 
Station can approximate the paintings it describes through photographic reproduction (though 
the efficacy and effect of such reproduction is limited), the descriptions of, and the cropped 
still from, Antonioni’s The Passenger only reproduce one aspect or moment of the film. In this 
sense, cinema is a peculiar object for ekphrasis in that the subject’s phenomenal relation to a 
cinematic object is always inherently and obviously mutable; cinema is not just a visual but an 
explicitly time-based art, and thus unlike the perception of stasis that comes with painting or 
sculpture, it is an object based not just on existence in space but in time. On the level of form, 
however, the relation between the cinematic object and its textual representation becomes 
more complicated, in that both media share a temporal direction: just as a film can be 
described as a number of shots in time, so a novel consists of words on a page which are read 
from beginning to end. Both media have an external chronology – the time it takes to watch a 
film, or read a book, and an internal chronology – the sequential forward movement of events 
in the narrative. The relationship between cinema and the novel is further complicated by each 
art object’s mode of representing this second chronology: if we follow Deleuze, the classical 
                                                
9 The most prominent exception to this comes in the recurrent references made to Gianlorenzo Bernini’s statue 
The Ecstasy of St Theresa, an art object which has great significance in the novel , and which is returned to later in 
this chapter. 
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cinema of the movement-image should be quite easily approximated by the novel’s inherent 
teleology; it is more difficult to imagine how the time- and crystal-images might find their 
textual equivalent. In analysing the fictional cinematic objects embedded in Infinite Jest, in 
particular how such objects relate to the surrounding discourse, we can therefore gain an 
insight into how the novel figures duration itself.    
The most useful point of departure for analysing the novel’s ekphrastic objects comes in the 
fictional oeuvre of J.O. Incandenza, experimental filmmaker and father to Orin, Mario, and 
Hal Incandenza. References to Incandenza’s work are scattered throughout Infinite Jest, most 
notably in sections focalised through Hal and Joelle van Dyne – ex-girlfriend of Orin and 
actor in Incandenza’s films – and in the ‘filmography’ found in one of the novel’s many 
endnotes. Unlike Leaving the Atocha Station, all art objects within Infinite Jest are figured textually; 
their ‘mediation’ is therefore more explicit, although as I hope to have shown, the idea that the 
visual is somehow representationally superior to the textual when dealing with embedded art 
objects is not sustainable. This is not to say, however, that the manner in which Incandenza’s 
films are rendered is of no consequence; quite the opposite. The wholly textual nature of the 
embedded art objects in Infinite Jest makes their fictionality more pronounced while also 
allowing them to blend seamlessly with the surrounding text. The way in which Incandenza’s 
films are figured therefore provides the most compelling evidence of the aesthetic sensibility 
that runs through the novel.   
In addition to biographical details, J.O. Incandenza is introduced as a filmmaker early in the 
novel. As with the majority of Infinite Jest, the section is narrated in third-person, the films 
described as 
…‘après-garde’ experimental- and conceptual-film work too far either ahead of or 
behind its time, possibly, to be much appreciated at the time of his death in the 
Year of the Trial-Size Dove Bar — although a lot of it (the experimental- and 
conceptual-film work) was admittedly just plain pretentious and unengaging and 
bad (Wallace Jest 64) 
At the end of this quote is an endnote: the aforementioned ‘filmography’, an eight-page list of 
Incandenza’s films. Each entry gives the name, date, ‘major players’, storage medium’s ‘gauge 
or gauges’, and distribution medium, among other details (986). The filmography therefore 
operates semi-ekphrastically, describing an essentially absent art object in detail. In doing so, it 
draws attention to the inadequacy of textual representation of the cinematic: reading the entire 
filmography brings the reader no closer to the phenomenal experience of viewing the work. 
 
 
38 
Mitchell’s category of ‘ekphrastic indifference’ seems to hold true here, at least according to 
the novel’s internal logic. 
The idea that textual representation is insufficient in describing its object is further 
exacerbated by the filmography’s parody of academic discourse. Fictional academic articles are 
cited throughout the filmography, following academic convention exactly though often 
including playful or parodic titles, for example: 
Romney and Sperber, ‘Has James O. Incandenza Ever Even Once Produced One 
Genuinely Original or Unappropriated or Nonderivative Thing?’ Post-Millennium 
Film Cartridge Journal nos. 7-9 (Fall/Winter, Y.P.W.), pp. 4-26 (990) 
Parodying academia in this way reiterates a disconnection between what is spoken or written 
about art objects and the experience of the art objects themselves. Despite the length and 
exhaustive detail of the endnote, little can be understood about what Incandenza’s aesthetic 
and filmic choices might actually look like. Further, the tone of ironic detachment prevalent 
throughout points fun at the enterprise of film theory in general, suggesting an inevitable, 
insurmountable gulf between literary and cinematic texts. While the ‘filmography’ as a mode is 
defined by its objectivity – it should act simply as a catalogue or record – the filmography in 
Infinite Jest is not solely taxonomic. The attention to creating a surface of academic convention 
and bibliographic detail means that the filmography has a somewhat paradoxical function, 
parodying academic discourse while performing its minutiae exactly. While the reader is never 
asked to believe that the filmography corresponds to any non-fictional art object, when 
individual films are described using what amount to simple value judgements – language that 
would of course be out of place in a ‘real’ filmography – such pronouncements have an 
implicit sense of validity, even if this validity only holds true in the fictional world. In addition, 
the use of rhetorical devices to argue a certain point about Incandenza’s work – the parody of 
academic vernacular in the latter quote, and in the former a predicate of value judgement 
arrived at in a sentence that begins without bias – establish a further level of distance between 
reader and film than what might occur through conventional or traditional ekphrasis. The 
text’s mediatory function is made obvious through the use of parody and irony as rhetorical 
devices, but in highlighting this mediation the novel suggests its inverse: that there is some 
final, authentic experience of the art object, but that such an experience cannot be rendered 
through text. 
While the filmography provides an overview of Incandenza’s work, Infinite Jest also includes 
sections in which characters’ own relations to the films are described. As the star of a number 
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of Incandenza’s late films, Joelle van Dyne might be expected to provide a less complex 
example of how cinematic objects are figured in the novel. Joelle’s background and continued 
interest in ‘Film & Film-Cartridge Theory’ mean that within the novel she is something of an 
expert; her responses and judgements are therefore imbued with a sense of authority, and lack 
the obvious alienating effect of the filmography’s academese. Under her stage name, ‘Madame 
Psychosis’, Joelle hosts the radio show ‘Sixty Minutes More or Less’, which consists of 
monologues described as ‘both free-associative and intricately structured’, with the ‘one even 
remotely consistent theme’ of film (185). One of the film movements Joelle is said to be 
exceptionally knowledgeable about is ‘anticonfluential cinema’, which, as detailed in an 
endnote, is  
An après-garde digital movement, a.k.a. ‘Digital Parallelism’ and ‘Cinema of 
Chaotic Stasis,’ characterized by a stubborn and possibly intentionally irritating 
refusal of different narrative lines to merge into any kind of meaningful 
confluence, the school derived somewhat from both the narrative bradykineticism 
of Antonioni and the disassociative formalism of Stan Brakhage and Hollis 
Frampton, comprising periods in the careers of the late Beth B., the Snow 
brothers, Vigdis Simpson, and the late J.O. Incandenza (middle period). (996) 
Like many of the works and movements with which Incandenza is associated, 
‘anticonfluential’ cinema is treated by both the characters and narrator(s) with a kind of ironic 
disdain: while never overtly mocked, the theory is aligned with the same tediously academic, 
non-communicative aesthetic category gestured towards in the filmography. That this lack of 
narrative convergence is ‘intentionally irritating’ is an opinion echoed in Joelle’s own thoughts 
– again narrated in third-person – on Incandenza’s filmmaking. In an extended analysis late in 
the novel, Joelle describes Incandenza’s cinematic work as 
More like the work of a brilliant optician and technician who was an amateur at 
any kind of real communication…no narrative movement toward a real story; no 
emotional movement toward an audience…like a very smart person conversing 
with himself (740) 
Here, narrative progression is conflated with an emotional connection with the viewer. As in 
the endnote quoted above, aesthetic categories (the lack of narrative ‘confluence’, ‘formalism’, 
etc.) become signifiers of value or lack thereof.  
The fictionality of the ‘anticonfluential’ means that – along with all Incandenza’s cinematic 
work – the only access point the reader has is the text itself. It is impossible to separate the art 
object from how it is figured in the text because there exists no art object outside the text; 
thus, any method of critique that attempts to analyse such concepts or objects will be 
 
 
40 
necessarily speculative. In examining the evidence provided to support the claim that 
Incandenza’s films are ‘unengaging and bad’, however, we can infer a clear system for the 
assignation of aesthetic value that also has implications for the ontological schema of the 
novel. The film “The Joke” is particularly useful in this regard, in that it is the most extreme 
representation of the problem Joelle finds in Incandenza’s work. Its entry in the filmography 
reads: 
The Joke. B.S. Latrodectus Mactans Productions. Audience as reflexive cast; 35 
mm. x 2 cameras; variable length; black and white; silent. Parody of Hollis 
Frampton’s ‘audience-specific events,’ two Ikegami EC-35 video cameras in 
theater record the ‘film’ ’s audience and project the resultant raster onto screen — 
the theater audience watching itself watch itself get the obvious ‘joke’ and become 
increasingly self-conscious and uncomfortable and hostile supposedly comprises 
the film’s involuted ‘antinarrative’ flow. Incandenza’s first truly controversial 
project, Film & Kartridge Kultcher’s Sperber credited it with ‘unwittingly sounding 
the death-knell of post-poststructural film in terms of sheer annoyance.’ 
NONRECORDED MAGNETIC VIDEO SCREENABLE IN THEATER 
VENUE ONLY, NOW UNRELEASED. (988-989) 
The film’s conceptual and self-referential nature is alienating, but more than that the film 
forces its audience into an uncertain phenomenological position of vacillation between subject 
and object. In this sense, reading “The Joke” in relation to Fried’s dictum on ‘literalist’ art is 
useful. As summarised by Robert Jackson, ‘literalism’ means that there is a specific onus on 
the spectator to ‘complete’ the artwork, whereas the modernist artwork is autonomous: 
‘already complete, unified’ and ‘beheld as such’ (Jackson 143). “The Joke” is described as 
further negating the object’s possible autonomy; not only does the spectator need to be 
present in order for a ‘complete’ artwork to exist, there literally is no artwork outside of the 
spectator. If Fried’s ‘theatricality’ results from the subject’s self-awareness as subject, in “The 
Joke” this is compounded by further effacement of the object until the ‘artwork’, such as it is, 
would consist only of the technical apparatus bringing it into being (the camera, projector, and 
screen) and the frame of context provided by the location of experience (the cinema or art 
gallery in which the film is projected, and more specifically, the space between projector and 
screen). The spectator’s position is therefore revealed to be essentially performative, but while 
“The Joke” suggests that such a response to the art object might not be restricted to this 
particular work – that is, the spectator is always in some way responding to contextual cues in 
order to perform an appropriate response to an object as ‘art’ – because there exists no object 
at all, in the filmography such context-dependence and performativity is dismissed as ‘sheer 
annoyance’. In this way, “The Joke” parallels ekphrasis because no object actually exists – only 
fiction – and therefore only the response to, and description of it exists. While “The Joke” is 
 
 
41 
something of an exception in its extremity, it highlights how the novel’s aesthetic sensibility 
might be usefully aligned with Fried’s theorising of autonomous art, and is thus at odds with 
the novel’s own apparently non-autonomous form. The configuration – and manipulation – of 
subject-object relations is of central importance in understanding how Incandenza’s work is 
figured in the novel, and perhaps more importantly, why it is figured as ‘pretentious and 
unengaging’.  
Through the access points available, it is clear that the novel’s fictional films represent a 
particular aesthetic. This aesthetic, predicated on a disruption of the spectator’s perspective of 
the art object, is throughout the novel described in negative terms. Major characters – Joelle 
included – do not ascribe value to the majority of Incandenza’s oeuvre, while the various 
parodies of academia and film scholarship serve both to discredit Incandenza as a filmmaker, 
and to make ridiculous the entire enterprise of (film) theory in general. If ekphrastic hope is, 
as Mitchell describes it, an attempt to overcome the medium specificity of the literary and the 
visual arts, in Infinite Jest this is instead highlighted by the fractured accounts given of 
Incandenza’s work. The novel’s cinematic objects thus remain subject to Mitchell’s ekphrastic 
indifference, despite their fictionality. 
While the examples used here are necessarily limited, the idea that Infinite Jest to some degree 
endorses medium specificity is one echoed in recent Wallace scholarship. In his essay 
“Representing Entertainment(s) in Infinite Jest”, Philip Sayers analyses the ekphrastic passages 
that describe Mario’s own films, arguing that through highlighting the different temporalities 
of the discourse and the film – due to various digressions the former progresses more slowly 
than the latter – the novel also highlights the different possibilities of each medium (Sayers 
356). Sayers concludes that the novel’s final position with regard to medium specificity is 
ambivalent; Infinite Jest, he claims, is irreducibly hybrid in form and is thus a ‘powerful call for 
balance’ between ‘high and low culture, and reading and spectating’ (Sayers 361). While 
Sayers’s conclusion is logical, he fails to acknowledge the effect of ekphrasis outside of 
questioning the representational adequacy of different media. This leads to the central 
problem with his conclusion: to suggest that Infinite Jest might be read as demonstrating such a 
‘balance’ between high and low culture is to pay attention only to the text’s surface – its easy 
reference to pop culture, both real and imagined – while ignoring the central role occupied by 
the question of aesthetic value. The content and rhetoric of those ekphrases concerned with 
Incandenza’s films suggest a schema in which the inability for the reader to access them is 
derived from the inability of Incandenza to produce sufficiently involving art objects, rather 
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than the impossibility of accessing any object completely. Thus, the central problem with the 
accounts given of Incandenza’s work in Infinite Jest is that the twin assumptions of medium 
specificity and aesthetic autonomy through which it is critiqued are themselves neither 
acknowledged nor interlocuted. What is essentially an ontological problem is confused with a 
question of value.  
So far, I have discussed how the novel describes Incandenza’s work in general, and in the 
specific case of “The Joke”. Conspicuous in its absence has been the most important art 
object described by the novel: “Infinite Jest” itself.10 Unlike the other films in the novel, the 
nature of “Infinite Jest” means that no character is sufficiently able to describe or represent 
the work after viewing it. The film thus inhabits a peculiar position – while it is commonplace 
for ekphrasis to describe fictional art objects, the purpose of such description is in part to 
convey to the reader what an aesthetic object is like, an enterprise made possible due to the 
object’s presence in the fictional world. “Infinite Jest” is an unusual object for the ekphrastic 
mode because both the reader and the characters in the novel can only speculate as to what it 
might be like. Further, in an interview with Helen Steeply of O.N.A.N.’s ‘Unspecified 
Services’ Joelle points to the possibility that within the storyworld of the novel, “Infinite Jest” 
might not exist at all:11 
I don’t know that he ever even got a finished Master. That’s your story. There 
wasn’t anything unendurable or enslaving in either of my scenes. Nothing like 
these actual-perfection rumors. These are academic rumors. He talked about 
making something quote too perfect. But as a joke. (940) 
Joelle’s account is useful in giving an account of “Infinite Jest” that both negates and confirms 
various aspects of the film previously established by the discourse, primarily through the 
exchanges between Steeply and Marathe. In this sense, the art object is again gestured towards 
but not accessed through text, but contra Lerner, this sense of contextual meaning creation 
does not enter the experience itself. As with “The Joke”, the question of whether any aesthetic 
object even exists is raised; in contrast to the earlier film, however, this uncertainty extends 
not just to the object’s fictional subjects, but to the reader of the text. While “The Joke” is 
described as controversial and audience-hostile due to its non-autonomous nature, “Infinite 
Jest” instead emphasises the non-autonomous nature of the novel’s form. The reader uses the 
various contextual cues the novel provides to imagine an embedded art object where none 
                                                
10 Following established convention, in this thesis the novel’s name is italicised while the fictional film is in 
double quotation marks.  
11 O.N.A.N. – the organisation of American nations – is the name given to the former United States and parts of 
Mexico and Canada in the novel; ‘Unspecified Services’ is the equivalent of the C.I.A.. 
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exists, a process consistent with all ekphrases but highlighted here by the characters’ own 
inability to access the work.  
The gestures towards “Infinite Jest” are also important in understanding the novel’s implicit 
aesthetic schema. While Joelle suggests that the ‘too-perfect’ concept is likely false, her 
description of the lenses used in the creation of the film suggests that it is the film’s formal 
features – its technical and optical qualities – that are behind its powerful effects: 
I don’t think there’s much doubt the lens was supposed to reproduce an infantile 
vision field. That’s what you could feel was driving the scene. My face wasn’t 
important. You never got the sense it was meant to be captured realistically by the 
lens. (940) 
Steeply, much earlier in the novel, describes the efforts of the O.N.A.N. scientists to 
understand the film, telling Marathe:  
Tom Flatto’s personal theory is the appeal’s got something to do with density. 
The visual compulsion. Theory’s that with a really sophisticated piece of 
holography you’d get the neural density of an actual stage play without losing the 
selective realism of the viewer-screen. That the density plus the realism might be 
too much to take. Dick Desai in Data Production wants to go in with ALGOL 
and see if there are Fourier Equations in the root code’s ALGOL, which would 
signify hologrammatical activity going on. (490-491) 
Joelle and Steeply’s accounts differ, in that while Joelle suggests that “Infinite Jest” is (at least 
partly) shot in order to replicate an ‘infantile vision field’, Steeply and the O.N.A.N. scientists 
believe that it is its ‘neural density’ that is most affecting.12 The reference to holography in the 
latter theory is important; an oblique reference to holography previously occurs (in the 
discourse; the section itself is the last chronological story event) when Hal states that he, 
‘believe[s] Dennis Gabor may very well have been the Antichrist’ – Gabor, a physicist, is best 
known for inventing holography (12). The indicators that “Infinite Jest” might be holographic 
in form are difficult to understand: the nature of holographic projection is quite different from 
standard film or photographic projection, and no indication is given in the novel that the 
InterLace Entertainment cartridges are capable of recording holographic material. However, 
these oblique references to holography remain productive points of analysis in Infinite Jest as in 
addition to emphasising the importance of its formal features, thinking through “Infinite Jest” 
in relation to holography allows a return to the categories of virtual and actual previously 
discussed. The image projected from a holograph is called a ‘virtual’ image; the nature of the 
image is thus fundamentally different to the regular photographic image. Steeply describes a 
                                                
12 See also pp. 490, 993 for references to the possible holographic properties of “Infinite Jest”. 
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theory wherein the ‘neural density’ plus ‘selective realism’ might be ‘too much’ for the viewer 
to take. Both descriptions suggest particular kinds of subject-object relations; what Steeply 
appears to claim is that through a particular kind of technique, “Infinite Jest” offers both a 
suggestion of density or depth – consistent with the idea of holography – situated within the 
frame of the screen. This would therefore create an image or series of images that had the 
illusion of real depth and existence in space while remaining paradoxically small and screen-
based. The power of “Infinite Jest” to incapacitate, then, would derive from the spectator’s 
perception of a disjunction between the virtual image and the actual moment of the film’s 
viewing; Hal identifies Gabor as the ‘Antichrist’ because he created a technology that prompts 
the feeling of reality while it remains a simulation. Again, then, it is clear that the novel is 
based upon a schema in which actual and virtual remain separate and distinct, wherein the 
virtual is always the lesser of the two categories. 
The value schema implied by “Infinite Jest” is complicated, however, because as an art object 
it is itself virtual: it is imagined, fictional, gestured towards only in text. Yet through the 
suggestion of optical and holographic effects, “Infinite Jest” is figured textually as a virtual art 
object that seems to exceed the boundaries of the virtual: its formal perfection is achieved 
through the simulation of reality. Deleuze’s account of the actual and virtual is again of use 
here. To reiterate the overview from the previous chapter: the ‘sensory-motor break’ refers to 
the move from the movement-image to the time-image; it therefore also refers to a movement 
from the image of the actual to the image of the virtual. The actual, as the present moment of 
the ‘real’, corresponds to lived experience: when we are considering action we exist in the 
category of the actual. Deleuze derives his conception of time from Bergson; the ‘time’ 
referred to in the Cinema books is not spatialised clock time, but duration. In this context, the 
actual can be understood as the present moment (in a spatial sense), but the term also 
indicates a particular relation to the lived world of reality, i.e. the experience of reality in the 
present. In contrast, the virtual signifies those categories – such as memory or fantasy – that 
can be ‘imaged’ in the present moment. To clarify this point, Deleuze posits two axes, again 
inherited from Bergson: the horizontal axis of duration, wherein the future moves into the 
past through the present, increasing our stores of memories; and the vertical axis, expansion 
upon which entails movement away from the present moment into the virtual, primarily 
through memory and dream (Rodowick 10). While Deleuze’s conception of this schema is 
perhaps not as clear-cut as this overview suggests, for the purposes of this chapter a basic 
understanding of these axes is sufficient.  
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“Infinite Jest” is described as drawing the viewer away from the present moment and thereby 
immobilising them; the viewer becomes static and catatonic due to being stuck on the vertical 
axis. In this sense, the viewer’s engagement with the film is harmful because through 
stimulating only the virtual, no actual action occurs – hence the exaggerated result of catatonia 
and stasis. The nature of the film as described in the text further suggests it represents the 
virtual in both form and content. The holographic and optical properties cause the viewer to 
perceive a simulated depth of field – a ‘neural density’ – that does not actually exist, while the 
content of the film – as far as Joelle’s account is accurate – replicates the perspective of an 
infant. Memory – recognition and recollection – are categories of the virtual; the employment 
of an infantile perspective therefore correlates to an expansion upon the vertical axis of the 
virtual. What is perhaps most interesting about drawing a connection between “Infinite Jest”, 
Infinite Jest, and Deleuze’s actual/virtual distinction is the extent to which the productive 
possibilities of the virtual are never suggested; unlike Leaving the Atocha Station, the categories 
of actual and virtual in Infinite Jest remain imbricated in a value schema that seems to extend 
beyond the terms of the novel. There is no question that, as readers, we are to conclude that 
“Infinite Jest” and its results are harmful; within the fictional world of the novel, this is a 
coherent coalescence of aesthetic and metaphysical concepts. Yet as with the other aspects of 
Incandenza’s filmmaking, though the nature of the embedded art object means that accounts 
of it are inescapably mediated, the fact that this mediation in language – especially when it 
takes the form of the ekphrastic mode – is inherently virtual and produces virtual, fictional art 
objects is never reflected upon. In other words, unlike Deleuze, and to an extent Lerner, the 
characters (and narrators) in Infinite Jest are consistent with one another in their aesthetic tastes 
to the extent that aesthetic and metaphysical categories such as those of ‘actual’ and ‘virtual’ 
become part of the novel’s generalised value schema. According to this schema, the ‘virtual’ is 
wholly negative, with expansion upon the vertical axis representing a solipsistic retreat into the 
self and subsequent immobility and stasis. This is in direct contrast to Deleuze, for whom the 
virtual is a category of production, of possibility and of the potential for difference. If the 
actual corresponds to the present moment of action, it also corresponds to the necessity of the 
present moment and the moments that follow, and can thus be broadly construed as 
teleological in the same way as the novel. Deleuze’s account of the virtual, however, describes 
a condition in which the movements into the past and future away from the certainty of the 
actual, lived moment result in a moment-to-moment freedom and the possibility of difference. 
The virtuality of “Infinite Jest” – its mutability and productive potential – is therefore 
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circumscribed by both the novel’s form and its underlying assumption about the nature of 
subject-object relations.  
The filmic ekphrases in Infinite Jest therefore imply a particular aesthetic value schema and its 
contingent subject-object dynamic. That the virtual is suppressed and dismissed in the novel is 
significant because it demonstrates how the relation between duration and the art object is 
conceptualised in the novel. As described by Rodowick, Deleuze’s direct image of time 
replaces the ‘deterministic universe’ with a ‘probabilistic’ one (Rodowick 15). In other words, 
as opposed to the teleological temporal progression found in the classical indirect image of 
time (and the conventional novel), through the direct image of time the condition of 
productive possibility is accessed. What makes this difference productive for the present 
discussion is that Deleuze defines the movement- and time-images aesthetically – that is, 
through form. A key way in which the time-image departs formally from its classical precursor 
is in the kind of cut used: the ‘rational’ cut of classical cinema determines ‘commensurable 
relations between series of images’ – therefore giving an indirect image of time – contra the 
‘irrational’ cut, wherein the cut itself becomes important due to its non-relation to the images 
surrounding it: ‘Instead of one image after the other, there is one image plus another, and each 
shot is deframed in relation to the framing of the following shot’ (Deleuze 213-214).13 The 
sensory-motor break is therefore aesthetic, but for Deleuze such an aesthetic shift implies a 
larger shift in the perceptual relationship between ‘man and the world’ (Deleuze 173). To 
return to the categories of actual and virtual, the ekphrastic objects of Infinite Jest inhabit a 
liminal space: they are wholly virtual, yet within the novel their value is assessed according to a 
schema in which the virtual is not just inferior to the actual, but non-existent. The novel 
therefore operates paradoxically: by suggesting that virtuality means an object does not exist, it 
undermines those points at which the actual – as understood by the novel – is gestured 
towards. If the virtual has no meaningful relation to the actual, the novel itself is made 
redundant and superfluous despite its conceptualisation of an accessible actual.  
In light of this schema’s priority of the actual, it is significant that the only non-fictional art 
object represented in the novel is a statue: by definition it is haptic and immobile. While the 
descriptions of The Ecstasy of St Theresa are no more of the actual than those that refer to 
Incandenza’s films, the recurrent – albeit brief – references to the statue suggest that within 
the novel it is understood to prompt a different kind of experience from Incandenza’s 
                                                
13 An example of the use of the irrational cut given by Deleuze is Bresson, whom both J.O. Incandenza and Joelle admire to 
various degrees. Bresson is one of the filmmakers Joelle, as Madame Psychosis, is said to refer to ‘sometimes’ on her radio 
show (185). Late in the novel, in a Hal-narrated section, we are told in passing, ‘Like the Parisian-French Bresson he so 
admired [J.O.] had no interest in suckering the audience with illusory realism’ (944). 
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‘pretentious’ and ‘unengaging’ films. Just before Joelle attempts suicide, she thinks of the 
statue: ‘the saint recumbent, half-supine, her flowing stone robe lifted by the angel in whose 
other hand a bare arrow is raised for that best descent … the angel’s expression not charity 
but the perfect vice of barb-headed love’ (235). Here, the statue’s perceived stasis provides 
Joelle with a singular point of ecstasy, but she is only imagining the statue and the actual 
encounter it might provide. In Deleuzian terms, Joelle is therefore moving along the vertical 
axis – because she can only imagine the statue her experience is figured as an escape from the 
actual world. The statue itself remains a fixed point. The very idea of escape or transcendence 
through accessing such a ‘real’ object is evidence of an ontological hierarchy that is incoherent 
when situated within the fictional world of the novel; that The Ecstasy of St Theresa is the model 
for such an object is important due to its inherent properties: its stasis suggests the atemporal, 
ahistorical way in which the novel understands object relations. 
The concept of stasis in Infinite Jest has been subject to some critical attention. Jeffrey Karnicky 
argues that it is itself productive, in a reading that employs Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand 
Plateaus for support. Karnicky takes the recurrent moments of what he calls ‘asignifying stasis’ 
throughout the novel as being points of catalyst and transformation, because ‘stasis points are 
points of subjectification that are not reducible to a root or unifiable to a world picture’ 
(Karnicky 121). Rather than an illusion of stasis being taken as evincing an autonomous and 
immobile actual object, Karnicky argues that the various points of stasis act as catalysts for 
action – that is, the subject experiences stasis as part of the actual, action-oriented world. 
Following the reading of Deleuze I have presented her, however, such stasis would surely be 
impossible because the ‘actual’ is constantly in flux and is defined by its basis in action. That 
my own argument is so different to Karnicky’s, despite our shared use of Deleuze’s theory, is 
perhaps evidence of the changing nature of the latter’s ideas. Yet, to my mind, Karnicky’s 
argument is flawed not because his reading of Deleuze is wrong, but because he reads Infinite 
Jest as being itself rhizomatic, as formally corresponding with the ‘flat multiplicities’ of A 
Thousand Plateaus. This represents a radical underreading of the novel; as I hope to have 
demonstrated thus far, to suggest that Infinite Jest articulates an ontological or aesthetic flatness 
ignores that its central organising principles are hierarchical.   
The hierarchy implied by Infinite Jest’s references to The Ecstasy of St Theresa is also evident in 
the novel’s narrative structure. Far from being rhizomatic in nature, the form of Infinite Jest 
continues to suggest a schema based on clear distinctions between the actual and virtual. 
Infinite Jest’s narrative is non-linear: it begins with the final story events of its chronology. This 
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is, of course, a common structural device, though the sheer length of Infinite Jest exacerbates 
any difficulty the reader might have in reconstructing the story. It is this last point that is 
important here: despite its appearance of formal ingenuity, Infinite Jest still relies on the 
existence of an underlying teleology for coherence: unlike Incandenza’s ‘anticonfluential’ 
cinema, the fractured nature of the narrative discourse is supposed to be reconstructed. The 
non-linear narrative is a kind of game for the reader, or, in Wallace’s words, a necessary piece 
of work that must be undertaken in order to receive the gratifying result of narrative 
coherence:14 
It’s supposed to be uneasy. For instance, using a lot of flash-cuts between scenes 
so that some of the narrative arrangement has got to be done by the reader, or 
interrupting flow with digressions and interpolations that the reader has to do 
with work of connecting to each other and to the narrative … if it works right, the 
reader has to fight through the mediated voice presenting the material to you. 
(McCaffery 137) 
While later in the quoted interview Wallace emphasises the importance of drawing attention to 
this mediation, the form of Infinite Jest itself is still predicated on the idea that ‘the material’ is 
somehow distinguishable from its form. In this sense, the novel mirrors the movement-
image’s assumption of the relation between subject and world; that is, it assumes the 
independence of its object, and, crucially, also assumes that this independence remains 
regardless of the presence of the camera (or, in this case, regardless of the narrative discourse). 
Wallace’s use of ‘through’ here is also important, in that it suggests a singular direction: the 
reader’s movement is predetermined. The reader’s intellectual ‘work’ is therefore in service of 
accessing the ‘actual’ – the ‘material’. Again, the implication is that the novel’s relationship to 
the world is fixed, that it simply acts as a bridge between the static categories of the subjective 
and objective. That the ‘material’ and its mediation – or the story and the narrative discourse, 
in this case – could be separated is a premise regarded with some suspicion within narrative 
theory: in her essay “Narrative Versions, Narrative Theories” Barbara Herrnstein Smith argues 
that such a dualistic model of narrative discourse evinces a ‘naïve Platonism’, and is ‘not only 
empirically questionable and logically frail but also methodologically distracting’ (Smith 213, 
231). There is therefore a parallel to be drawn between the unsustainability of the 
story/narrative discourse distinction and the construal of the categories of actual and virtual as 
separate and unrelated, even when the very form in which they are found would seem to 
negate such clear-cut categorisation.   
                                                
14 Though this work can be outsourced: see, for example, Stephen Burn’s David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest: A 
Reader’s Guide, which includes a fully reconstructed chronology of the novel’s events.  
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A further key figure in understanding the schema upon which Infinite Jest is predicated is 
Mario, the middle Incandenza brother.15 While Joelle’s character development suggests 
movement towards redemption – or at least away from addiction – Mario remains static.16 He 
is perhaps the least critical or reflexive character in the novel, and is described as intellectually 
…slow, Hal’s brother is, technically, Stanford-Binet-wise, slow, the Brandeis 
C.D.C. found — but not, verifiably not, retarded or cognitively damaged or 
bradyphrenic, more like refracted, almost, ever so slightly epistemically bent, a 
pole poked into mental water and just a little off and just taking a little bit longer, 
in the manner of all refracted things. (314) 
Despite – or more accurately, because of – this, Mario is central to the novel’s aesthetic and 
metaphysical schema. Because Wallace associates intellectualism with the virtual and therefore 
with disengagement and solipsism, Mario represents a kind of ideal subject, but the fact that it 
is his disability which results in this subject position makes him a strange kind of martyr figure. 
As ‘the least cynical person in the history of Enfield MA’, he is firmly on the side of those 
values the novel espouses as ‘good’: sincerity, authenticity, lack of irony (184). Significantly, 
Mario also both believes in God and has his own semi-Christ-like status within the novel, his 
birth being referred to as, ‘[t]he first birth of the Incandenzas’ second son’ (40-41; 312). 
Despite his physical deformity, Mario is unashamed and demonstrates no self-pity, placing 
him in direct contrast with Joelle.17 Just as Joelle’s purported expertise colours her ekphrastic 
passages with authority, Mario’s lack of cynicism and faith suggest sincerity, authenticity, and a 
lack of his father’s pretension. Mario’s ekphrastic passages are therefore informed by the 
reader’s understanding of his role within the novel.  
Like his father, Mario is a filmmaker; the two are described as having been ‘inseparable’ before 
Incandenza’s death (314). While Mario’s own cinematic output forms a key element of his 
characterisation, and is the object of an extended ekphrastic passage in the novel, it is not in 
the description of film but radio that Mario’s role in the novel’s aesthetic schema is made 
clear.18 Mario is an avid listener to Joelle’s film-centric show ‘Sixty Minutes More or Less’; in 
the narrative present, Mario hears a recording of an episode coming from Ennet House, 
where Joelle herself is (unbeknownst to Mario) currently a resident. Hearing the show 
                                                
15 Or possibly half-brother. Hints that Charles Tavis, Mario’s maternal uncle (though possibly not through blood –Tavis 
possibly being Avril Incandenza’s stepbrother [81; 901]), might in fact be his biological father, abound. See Infinite Jest 312; 
314; 316; 451; 901; 1044, note 244). 
16 See 590. 
17 Joelle’s (possible) deformity causes her to cover her face at all times with a veil, as she is a member of the Union of the 
Hideously and Improbably Deformed (U.H.I.D.). Mario is approached by a ‘veiled legate’ from the U.H.I.D. but is asked to 
leave by his younger brother: ‘it was Hal, even as Mario laughed and half-bowed, it was Hal, brandishing his Dunlop stick, 
who told the guy to go peddle his linen someplace else.’ (317) 
18 For a useful description of what is going on in the aforementioned ekphrastic passages surrounding Mario’s untitled film (a 
remake of his father’s “The ONANtiad”, with puppets), see Sayers 355ff.  
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prompts a passage – still in third-person – that is both ekphrastic (i.e. it describes Mario’s 
response to the art object in the narrative present) and describes Mario’s historical relationship 
to the work(s): 
Mario’d fallen in love with the first Madame Psychosis programs because he felt 
like he was listening to someone sad read out loud from yellow letters she’d taken 
out of a shoebox on a rainy P.M., stuff about heartbreak and people you loved 
dying and U.S. woe, stuff that was real. It is increasingly hard to find valid art that 
is about stuff that is real in this way. (592)  
It is important to note here that Mario’s interest in Joelle’s work is not in itself problematic. 
What does constitute a problem for any critical study of the text is that this interest – this 
value judgement – is contextually-determined by the surrounding text to function as a signifier 
of aesthetic value in general. Unlike the filmography, the voice used to describe Mario’s 
appreciation of ‘Sixty Minutes More or Less’ is indistinguishable from the third-person 
narrator that makes similar proclamations throughout the text. What occurs here, then, is the 
combination of the ekphrastic mode with the gnomic present: the nature of ekphrasis as a 
gesture towards an inaccessible object is undermined in order to affix a statement of static, 
ahistorical truth. If ekphrasis is a mode for describing the subject’s experience of the object, 
the above passage uses this relation to suggest that Mario has full access to the (art) object; 
through listening to Joelle’s show, he accesses a ‘real’ that is, throughout the novel, determined 
as the real.  
For similar reasons to his appreciation of Joelle’s radio show, Mario is a fan of Ennet House 
itself: the two times he’s been invited inside he’s felt that ‘it’s very real’ (591). Ennet House’s 
residents are recovering addicts, including – after her attempted overdose – Joelle, and Don 
Gately, a member of staff to whom Joelle becomes close. Gately is, along with Hal, one of the 
strongest contenders for the title of protagonist in the novel; unlike Hal, however, he has 
reached the nadir of his addiction – as is recounted in the novel’s final section – and is now on 
the way to recovery. The key element in this recovery – and, it is implied, in the recovery of all 
addicts – is his acceptance of the principles of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). These principles 
are again demonstrative of how the relation between text and world is construed in the novel. 
In essence, AA involves accession to a system or schema that is irrational; as one character 
states, AA ‘defie[s] sense…you just [have] to accept it on faith’ (533). At the heart of the AA 
project, then, is a kind of meta-aim: one cannot complete the twelve-step program without 
first believing that the twelve-step program will work. This involves the same suspension of 
critical or analytical thought as prioritising the actual over the virtual. The logic of AA also 
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requires that one focus entirely on the present moment, in order to overcome the pain 
inherent in duration, as recalled by Gately: 
Feeling the edge of every second that went by. Taking it a second at a time. 
Drawing the time in around him real tight. Withdrawing. Any one second: he 
remembered: the thought of feeling like he’d be feeling this second for 60 more of 
these seconds — he couldn’t deal. He could not fucking deal. He had to build a 
wall around each second just to take it. The whole first two weeks of it are 
telescoped in his memory down into like one second — less: the space between 
two heartbeats. A breath and a second, the pause and gather between each cramp. 
An endless Now stretching its gull-wings out on either side of his heartbeat. And 
he’d never before or since felt so excruciatingly alive. Living in the Present 
between pulses. (859-860) 
The idea of ‘Living in the Present’ is one of many platitudes through which the AA program 
functions; it also corresponds almost exactly to the action-oriented Deleuzian definition of the 
actual. The cliché nature of such phrases is highlighted throughout the novel; Geoffrey Day, 
Ennet House resident and former academic who ‘came in saying on his Intake he also manned 
the helm of a Scholarly Quarterly’, is one of multiple characters who criticise AA for this very 
reason (272). On the AA concept of asking for gratitude, Day states: 
…I cultivate gratitude. That’s part of the system of clichés I’m here to live by. An 
attitude of gratitude. A grateful drunk will never drink. I know the actual cliché is 
“A grateful heart will never drink,” but since organs can’t possibly be said to 
imbibe and I’m still afflicted with just enough self-will to decline to live by utter 
non sequiturs, as opposed to just good old clichés, I’m taking the liberty of light 
amendment…Albeit grateful amendment, of course. (271) 
Day’s voice here is inflected with irony: he treats the clichés and platitudes of AA with the 
same ironic detachment criticised elsewhere in the novel, particularly by and through Mario. 
Thus, while Day believes himself to be of superior intellect to those around him, in the novel 
he is the manifestation of the kind of turgid academese parodied in the filmography.19 This 
disparity is further highlighted through Gately’s own thoughts on Day: 
If Day ever gets lucky and breaks down, finally, and comes to the front office at 
night to scream that he can’t take it anymore and clutch at Gately’s pantcuff and 
blubber and beg for help at any cost, Gately’ll get to tell Day the thing is that the 
clichéd directives are a lot more deep and hard to actually do. To try and live by 
instead of just say. […] He tries to feel like Day is teaching him patience and 
tolerance. It takes great patience and tolerance not to want to punt the soft little 
guy into the Comm. Ave. ravine and open up his bunk to somebody that 
desperately wants it, the Gift. Except who is Gately to think he can know who 
wants it and who doesn’t, deep down. (273) 
                                                
19 An article of Day’s on the history of the A.F.R. is plagiarised by E.T.A. student Jim Struck; Day’s prose is described as 
resembling somebody ‘flecking your forehead with spittle as he ranted grandiosely’ (1056).  
 
 
52 
Again, the emphasis is on action over the perceived flight into the virtual. Gately’s self-doubt 
and mindfulness are in direct contrast to Day’s know-it-all attitude. What is of particular 
interest here however is the way in which the novel combines the idea of a central truth or 
accessible actual with an aesthetic banality. It is directly because of their lack of traditional 
formal aesthetic value that the clichés of AA are understood in the novel as being truthful, as 
being part of the ‘stuff that is real’.  
In addition to the distinction between actual and virtual, Infinite Jest therefore places in conflict 
the aesthetic and the anti-aesthetic. Such a conflict is not original to the novel; it is a central 
concern of critical theory throughout the twentieth century, particularly prominent in 
Benjamin and Adorno. It is worth, here, returning to their shared – and debated – aesthetic 
and metaphysical theories in order to expand the arguments I initiated earlier in this chapter. 
If Infinite Jest is – as I suggest – concerned with outlining a particular aesthetic schema based 
on a particular kind of subject-object relation, then such a gesture itself evinces the very kind 
of ‘outside’ perspective that Adorno so forcefully argues against. Both the aesthetic endorsed, 
and the fact of this endorsement, are therefore essential parts of the novel’s relationship with 
the reader and with the world. To employ theorists of an aesthetic tradition that existed long 
before Wallace was writing might appear to fall victim to the kind of historical reasoning that 
suggests the novel mode can be considered outside of its specific context. Yet the question 
here is not simply whether Wallace does or does not conform to a historically distant 
principle. Infinite Jest is a novel that engages explicitly with aesthetic subject-object relations. If 
Leaving the Atocha Station inhabits a critical or theoretical position inherited from Adorno’s 
negative dialectics, it is also formally consistent with this position; that is, theory and form are 
congruent throughout. I want to suggest here that Infinite Jest, on the other hand, despite its 
oft-lauded length, breadth, and depth, is built upon an inconsistent ontology, which the 
novel’s form serves to both highlight and refract.  
In engaging the conceptual apparatus of critical theory to interlocute Infinite Jest, perhaps the 
most useful term from which to depart is that of aura. In Adorno – and again, he is 
responding to Benjamin – we find the defence of an auratic art wherein the establishing 
principle is that of distance; that is, aura, as Adorno understands the term, is itself defined by a 
sense of compounded distance, of the loss or impossibility of aura itself. Adorno and 
Benjamin are often viewed in opposition when it comes to this idea: Adorno is the elitist, 
committed to an auratic modernism; Benjamin, on the other hand, is engaged with the reality 
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of technical reproducibility and its implications.20 Each side argues that theirs enables critical 
perspective and sociopolitcal praxis to emerge. Yet such descriptions ignore the important 
shared concerns of both thinkers, as Robert Kaufman writes, 
…one may ratify or contest either side’s vision of how art best instantiates social 
labour; yet precisely this labour is crucial to both sides in the controversy. Why? 
Because not just in Adorno, but at memorable moments in Benjamin as well, 
aura’s trace-presence, its charged distance, its luminous and disturbing 
conjugations of otherness, had once registered – amongst other things – the 
potentials of a collective subject’s labour power and agencies. (Kaufman 123) 
For both Adorno and Benjamin, then, aura and critical agency are imbricated due to the 
potential inherent in the idea of auratic distance and the intellectual labour required for its 
apprehension. Kaufman’s argument is thus important: not only does it bring further 
complexity to the Adorno-Benjamin dialogue, it allows a critical apparatus to be developed 
from Adorno’s aesthetic theory that allows for further access and understanding of the idea of 
thinking against thought through the negative dialectic. The term aura as it is used by 
Benjamin and his interlocutors is contentious precisely because it is not always consistent; as 
Miriam Hansen states in “Benjamin’s Aura”, its meaning and usefulness are dependent upon 
the particular constellation in which it is deployed. In using the concept of aura in relation to 
Infinite Jest, then, I want to both acknowledge its historical vicissitude while concomitantly 
relying on its later adoption by Adorno as an aesthetic category as a way to stabilise, and 
therefore maximise the heuristic function of, the term for this particular project.  
Hansen traces Benjamin’s use of the term through materials that precede the famous artwork 
essay. Aura is found to be a far less delimited concept than much scholarship on Benjamin 
presumes; as Hansen describes, aura is defined by  
…elements of disjunctive temporality—its sudden and fleeting disruption of 
linear time, its uncanny linkage of past and future—and the concomitant 
dislocation of the subject are articulated through, rather than in mere opposition 
to, the technological media. (Hansen 347) 
Hansen posits that the artwork essay is thus restrictive in its definition of aura: through 
connecting it to ‘traditional’ artworks, Benjamin makes aura pertain to ‘the special status of the 
art object’, as opposed to his earlier theorisation that aura is found in all things (Hansen 351). 
This, according to Hansen, is what Adorno extrapolates into an objective aesthetic category as 
the ‘semblance of autonomy in the work’ (Hansen 351). However, while Adorno’s use of the 
                                                
20 For a brief but useful overview of Adorno and Benjamin’s conflicting ideas on this subject, see Simon Jarvis, Adorno: A 
Critical Introduction (1998), pp. 77-80. 
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term is focused on the artwork, it is also an essential element of his wider metaphysical theory. 
In this sense, what appears to be a failure on Adorno’s part to properly construe the 
complexity of Benjamin’s original concept can actually be understood as consistent with the 
former’s own approach to subject-object relations. In other words, while Hansen is correct 
that Adorno’s concept of aura is centred on the artwork, this does not negate the term’s 
usefulness in relation to his formulation of a larger metaphysical schema.  
This connection is clarified through an understanding of the categories of ‘aesthetic’ and ‘anti-
aesthetic’ as used by Adorno. The use of only these terms is perhaps incorrect: the Adorno-
Benjamin debate has, according to Kaufman, been misconstrued by critics who do not take 
into account the further difference between the terms ‘aesthetic’ and ‘aestheticization’ 
(Kaufman 124). This latter distinction is of great importance, both to achieving a full 
understanding of Adorno’s aesthetics, and in any attempt – such as this thesis – to relate such 
ideas to aesthetic objects themselves. As Kaufman explains, Adorno’s well-known contempt 
for certain currents in twentieth-century art is due to their ‘anti-aesthetic’ sensibility (Kaufman 
123). For Adorno, because of the distinction between aesthetic and aestheticist, such an anti-
aesthetic position ‘one-sidedly indict[s] or eschew[s] auratic aesthetic autonomy’ and therefore 
contributes ‘to the destruction of genuinely critical response’ (Kaufman 124).  
As in Kaufman, the lyric mode is central to aura in Hansen’s genealogy of the term; it is in the 
lyric that Benjamin identifies the distancing effect of aura on the subject. According to this 
account, aura is thus aligned with the kind of art that Fried argues for in “Art and 
Objecthood”. The distance that constitutes the auratic quality of art ‘cannot be produced at 
will; it appears to the subject, not for it’ (Hansen 352). However, that auratic art should be 
conflated with autonomous art is problematic, as the latter term veers dangerously close to 
making categorical assumptions about what counts as an aesthetic object and what does not, 
and thus opposes the idea of the art object’s  contextual dependence. There is a need, here, in 
light of Hansen’s comments about aura, to move away from the term as an essentialising and 
prescriptive one. To reiterate my earlier point about Hansen’s reading, the term remains useful 
if we assume that it is, firstly, applicable to thinking the otherness of all objects, and secondly 
(and perhaps more importantly), that auratic art for Adorno is based on the fundamental loss 
or impossibility of experiencing aura directly; that is, the term is coherent only when 
acknowledged negatively. Negative aura therefore makes sense when understood as the 
acknowledgement of the impossibility of an autonomous auratic object – or, at least, in the 
possibility for the subject to ever experience it as such. 
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For Adorno, implicit in the pursuit of the aesthetic is therefore an acknowledgement of its 
impossibility. In contrast to the anti-aesthetic, a dedication to the aesthetic ‘paradoxically 
winds up being anti-aestheticist’ (Kaufman 124). Kaufman clarifies Adorno’s argument: 
Adorno contends that the aesthetic allows for the experimental development of a 
protocritical consciousness whose aesthetic play or felt spontaneity mimes social labour 
insofar as artistic making and aesthetic experience tend processively to discover aspects 
of the social that have been obscured by status quo conceptualizations of the latter; 
aestheticization, meanwhile, is for Adorno the proper name of an unreflective 
acquiescence to reification. (Kaufman 124) 
Adorno’s argument is immensely relevant here: that ‘aestheticization’ – the anti-aesthetic – 
evinces an unreflective attitude towards the world is an argument supported by the reading of 
Infinite Jest I have presented here. Adorno’s argument shares the logic of those aspects of his 
thought discussed in the previous chapter. A key point at which Adorno disagrees with Lukács 
is in the former’s insistence on the impossibility of elevating practice over theory; as Jarvis 
explains, for Adorno any attempt to do so – i.e. to break from negation – results in 
contemplative reinforcement of the present social and structural reality (Jarvis 188). Though it 
might seem contradictory for Adorno to then claim that aesthetically committed practice can 
result in critical agency, his schema is not unintelligible because his aesthetic theory is 
grounded in the belief that auratic art is already defined by aesthetic distance. Because the anti-
aesthetic sensibility intentionally abandons aura completely, it fails to even negatively 
acknowledge what Kaufman describes as the ‘crucial modern phenomenon of aura’s loss (or at 
least its apparent loss)’ (Kaufman 124).  While the pursuit of an auratic art can potentially 
result in aestheticization and affirmation of the present, it also has the ability to, through its 
implicit distance, provide a condition of possibility wherein critical agency might occur. In 
other words, while Adorno recognises the failings of some auratic art, he maintains that the 
particular kind of aura he theorises is of essential importance in that it allows the subject 
momentary access to the other, to ‘look beyond the walls of the prison’ of subjectivity 
(Adorno Aesthetic 347).21  
While Adorno’s distinction between the aesthetic and the aestheticist is therefore useful, it 
seems as though we again arrive at a contradiction: if Adorno’s metaphysics is grounded on a 
non-essentialist, non-transcendental philosophy, surely such a ‘look beyond’ to the other is 
impossible. Indeed, as Jarvis states, Adorno argues that we could never ‘have access to some 
                                                
21 Kaufman emphasises the distinction between Adorno’s ‘via negativa’ aura and the term as used by ‘official 
culture’ to ‘re-enchant and reconcile a world still scored by profound exploitation and stark inequality’ (Kaufman 
264, note 4). 
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kind of immediate objectivity wholly free of subjective mediation. Any such promise would be 
delusive because ‘cognitive ‘access’ to immediacy is already a mediation of it’ (Jarvis 183). 
How, then, can this be figured as anything but such a transcendental perspective, predicated 
on an encounter with an aesthetic object as invariant ground? To answer this question, it is 
perhaps useful to return to the idea of the constellation previously discussed. If Adorno’s 
looking beyond subjectivity is compared with constellatory form’s gesture towards the non-
identical, it becomes clear that a more accurate translation of Adorno’s original German here 
is ‘glimpse’: subjective cognition is inescapable, but to think otherness, even while such 
thought remains inescapably mediated by subjectivity, is enough, for Adorno, to form the 
predicate of critical agency. Adorno calls the condition for this glimpse Erschütterung – a 
‘tremor’ – which ‘signals the breaking through of objectivity into subjective consciousness’ at 
the point in which the subjective response is at its most intense; such a tremor, however, is 
illusory: ‘in its immediacy tremor senses the existence of a potential that pretends it is real’ 
(Adorno Aesthetic 348). What Adorno outlines is therefore not a transcendent theory, but a 
theory in which the illusory power of the tremor gestures towards the non-identical.  
Aura is thus useful here because it converges on the same axis as those Benjaminian-Adornian 
terms discussed in the previous chapter, and extends their application to a novel in which anti-
aestheticism is combined with a theory of the autonomous art object. As Kaufman’s essay 
demonstrates, aura is important to consider when exploring Adorno’s aesthetic theories, for it 
is partly through his idea of auratic art – particularly as it is expressed in the lyric mode – that 
his negative dialectics becomes increasingly coherent as a theoretical framework. As I have 
argued, in Infinite Jest there is a tension between the machinations of form the novel performs, 
and the anti-aesthetic sensibility it contains. In the following section, I want to expand this 
point, and suggest that while Infinite Jest approaches the kind of auratic distance (and critical 
agency) Adorno finds in the lyric, this is ultimately negated by the novel’s insistence upon an 
essentialist, transcendental schema, in which art objects are, phenomenologically speaking, 
wholly accessible to the subject and thus capable of providing not just a ‘glimpse’ beyond 
subjectivity, but an escape from subjectivity itself.  
This central problem of Infinite Jest’s aesthetics is evident towards the end of Joelle’s reflection 
on Incandenza’s films. After dismissing much of the oeuvre, Joelle turns her attention to the 
film “Pre-Nuptial Agreement of Heaven and Hell”, the story of an ‘alcoholic sandwich-bag 
salesman’ that concludes with a ‘240-second motionless low-angle shot’ of The Ecstasy of St 
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Theresa (742). The entire film is shot from the salesman’s point of view; the final shot’s 
significance, for Joelle, is thus predicated on this first-person perspective: 
The statue, the sensuous presence of the thing, let the alcoholic sandwich-bag 
salesman escape himself, his tiresome ubiquitous involuted head, she saw, was the 
thing. The four-minute still shot maybe wasn’t just a heavy-art gesture or 
audience-hostile herring. Freedom from one’s own head, one’s inescapable P.O.V. 
— Joelle started to see here, oblique to the point of being hidden, an emotional 
thrust, since the mediated transcendence of self was just what the apparently 
decadent statue of the orgasmic nun claimed for itself as subject. […] [T]he film’s 
climactic statue’s stasis…presented the self-forgetting of alcohol as inferior to that 
of religion/art. (742) 
Though the term ‘mediated transcendence of self’ seemingly recalls Adorno, Joelle’s reading 
clearly indicates that the art object is circumscribed by this function; that is, the purpose of the 
statue in the film is simply to provoke the transcendence of the spectator, just as the static 
shot of it is supposed to produce the same effect for the film’s audience. The art object – ‘the 
thing’ – is not opaque but wholly available to the spectator; the statue’s ‘sensuous presence’ is, 
as I have argued, conceived as autonomous and static, and thus representative of the real or 
actual in both the internal and external subject-object relations of the novel. Further, that the 
final sentence describes a hierarchy of objects through which to achieve such transcendence is 
important. Throughout Infinite Jest, characters are engaged in the pursuit of ‘self-forgetting’ – 
most obviously through numerous drug and alcohol addictions, but just as persuasively 
through television and “Infinite Jest” itself.22 Until this point, this pursuit is almost wholly 
negatively framed, yet here Joelle identifies the idea of transcendence as the ‘moral thesis’ of 
Incandenza’s work. As described previously, Incandenza’s film work is almost universally 
disparaged by the novel’s other characters. It stands to reason, then, that the moral thesis of 
Incandenza’s work should be taken in the same light: that is, it represents the opposite of what 
the novel, itself an art object, asks of its reader. There certainly seems to be a disparity 
between this pursuit of self-forgetting and the ‘Living in the Present’ cliché espoused by 
Alcoholics Anonymous. The presentation of the transcendent schema here, focalised as it is 
through Joelle, neither supports nor negates Incandenza’s ‘moral thesis’. Yet whether the 
schema described here was intended to be viewed in opposition to the novel’s main thesis is 
irrelevant. Because of how the statue is situated within the novel, it becomes clear that its 
claim to actuality is consistent with, rather than in opposition to, the way in which AA clichés 
                                                
22 The most clear-cut example of television addiction outside of the special case of “Infinite Jest” comes in the story of 
Steeply’s father, who becomes ‘consumed’ by the television series M*A*S*H (638-648). Steeply describes his father as 
eventually appearing, ‘[p]ulled apart in different directions…[a]s if he were stuck wondering. As if there was something he’d 
forgotten’ (647). Throughout the novel there is an important connection drawn between addiction, the forgetting of self, and 
stasis.  
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also delimit an accessible actual. The text itself mirrors the essentialist, transcendental schema 
of “Pre-Nuptial Agreement” through its embedded art objects, and through the employment 
of a narrative style that is non-linear and assumes an outside perspective.  
This chapter’s reading of the novel is in part a response to the thread of Wallace criticism that 
argues the novel is in fact dialogic in nature. Adam Kelly suggests that in Wallace we find, 
following Mikhail Bakhtin, ‘a dialogic context in which both sides of the argument can be 
offered to the reader, without a clear authorial conclusion drawn’ (Kelly Dialogue 275).23 Kelly’s 
point that there is no clear authorial conclusion to be drawn from Infinite Jest is based on the 
various dialogues of ‘ideas’ between characters in the novel, particularly the recurrent Marathe-
Steeply dialogue. In this instance, his assertion perhaps holds true; as he states, both Marathe’s 
and Steeply’s sides of the argument read persuasively (Kelly Dialogue 275). Yet this argument 
seems to ignore those places in the novel – some of which I have detailed in this chapter – in 
which the text itself quite clearly points to which ‘side’ of the various arguments made is 
valued more highly. That a novel might remain in a dialogic state while also having a 
fundamentally essentialist metaphysical basis is incoherent. This also negates Kelly’s claim that 
‘there is therefore no bottom line in Wallace’s novels, no master discourse … there are instead 
a plurality of ways to approach the problem Wallace is addressing’ (Kelly Dialogue 280). Yet the 
treatment of art objects within the novel directly supports the assertion that there is an outside 
text to Infinite Jest.  
In Infinite Jest Wallace works to establish an accessible ‘actual’ – aligned throughout with the 
Adornian anti-aesthetic – which while not necessarily physical or material is always invariant; 
that is, the actual as a category in Infinite Jest is essentialist, assuming the possibility of an 
ahistorical, non-contextually-dependent subject-object relation. This, importantly, reflects 
Wallace’s own statement on the idea of the real: 
                                                
23 See also the echo of a similar sentiment in Tim Personn, “The Dave Show”. Personn states: 
 
If it was impossible, however, to articulate ethical propositions in a straightforward manner, Wallace 
reasoned, he could still try to approach them indirectly. Indeed, Wallace's solution to the problem of 
addressing Wittgenstein's ineffable was dialectical. His texts, above all Infinite Jest, contained their own 
criticism, calling into question their own assumptions about metaphysical certainties. They spiraled upwards 
in ever-rising doubt, causing vertigo in readers who tried to sort out which attitude was superior: Hal 
Incandenza's ennui or his brother Mario's sentimental antics? Sociologist Geoffrey Day's sarcasm or ex-addict 
Don Gately's infantilization? With no authorial commentary to guide them, Wallace's readers were deflected 
back into their own value judgments. (Personn 2011) 
 
My point, here, is that such criticism takes the formal and structural features of Infinite Jest – in particular the number of 
sections devoted to various characters – and ignores the consistencies and discrepancies in their rendering. For instance, if 
there is no recourse to ‘authorial commentary’ in Infinite Jest, how can the use of irony with regard to Incandenza’s 
filmography be accounted for? 
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Everyone is extremely conscious of manipulating how they come off in the media; 
they want to structure what they say so that the reader or audience will interpret it 
in the way that is most favorable to them. What's interesting to me is that this isn't 
all that new. This was the project of the Sophists in Athens, and this is what 
Socrates and Plato thought was so completely evil. The Sophists had this idea: 
Forget this idea of what's true or not—what you want to do is rhetoric; you want 
to be able to persuade the audience and have the audience think you're smart and 
cool. And Socrates and Plato, basically their whole idea is, "Bullshit. There is such 
a thing as truth, and it's not all just how to say what you say so that you get a good 
job or get laid, or whatever it is people think they want." (Wallace 1999) 
In his dismissal of ‘rhetoric’, Wallace again posits a clear-cut distinction between actual and 
virtual. His own rhetoric here is important: consistent with Infinite Jest, Wallace expounds an 
anti-formalist or anti-aesthetic position, the ‘truth’ of which is supported by the supposed lack 
of attention to form in its utterance. This is of course nonsensical: the rhetorical strategy of 
‘dumbing down’ Wallace uses to reinforce his point is commonplace. In light of the above 
quote, it is important to point here to the extensive critical and cultural attention paid to 
Wallace himself as harbinger of a shift towards what has variously been called ‘post-
postmodernism’, ‘metamodernism’ or the ‘New Sincerity’. Such accounts lie outside the scope 
of this chapter (and thesis), but it is important to bear in mind the correlation between the 
conception of aesthetic sincerity, authenticity or ‘goodness’ in Infinite Jest, and Wallace’s oft-
cited own views on the matter.24  
Through exploring the descriptions of art objects in the novel, it becomes apparent that the 
‘truth’ of which Wallace speaks – the ‘actual’ of Infinite Jest – has no inverse within the novel: 
while the ‘virtual’ is gestured towards in Incandenza’s filmography, particularly in “Infinite 
Jest” itself, it is never included as a viable aspect of the subject’s encounter with the world. 
Without the negative definition of the virtual, however, the ‘actual’ comes to seem increasingly 
arbitrary and incoherent. Through this lack of the virtual the novel is circumscribed. In the 
attention to the pursuit of the ‘actual’, and the dismissal of those aspects of aesthetic relations 
that fall under the category of the ‘virtual’, Infinite Jest, despite its often recursive nature, avoids 
reflection on itself as an aesthetic object, as both a physical object in the world and a ‘virtual’ 
object. 
To return, briefly, to the description of “Pre-Nuptial Agreement of Heaven and Hell”, 
Bernini’s statue again provides a useful model for the kind of subject-(aesthetic)object 
                                                
24 Of particular interest here are Wallace’s own “E Unibus Pluram” essay, and the interview with Larry McCaffery that 
accompanied its original publication. In terms of criticism, see Adam Kelly’s “David Foster Wallace and the New Sincerity in 
American Fiction”, wherein the concept of ‘sincerity’ in Wallace’s oeuvre is interlocuted through reference to Lionel Trilling 
and Jacques Derrida.  
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relations the novel delineates. Art objects found in fiction have all the qualities – and 
associated possibilities – of the virtual; that is, they are not tethered to the material world 
through anything other than the actual, printed text on the page. Yet in Infinite Jest the 
possibilities of such virtuality are never explored; art objects in the novel remain statue-like: 
fixed, invariant, and attached to a metaphysical schema that is itself non-productive. If 
constellatory thought holds the possibility of critical agency through allowing the subject a 
glimpse of the non-identical, such a model is also based on movement and change, on the 
historical and material permeability of the object. As Alison Stone describes: 
…it seems that constellations can never exhaustively grasp an object because of 
the nature of objects, specifically the fact that their histories – which make them 
the particular objects they are – are unfinished, ever ongoing. Concepts are 
incomplete because their objects are incomplete, embroiled in processes such that 
many aspects of their past histories are simply not available to be grasped. (Stone 
60) 
Infinite Jest is therefore a text that appears to approach the constellatory mode: its lack of final 
narrative coherence and intermittent use of the philosophical dialogue might be read as formal 
gestures towards the impossibility of ever fully accessing the object. Yet through the object 
relations depicted within the text, and in a wider sense the text’s own relation to the reader 
and to the world, it becomes clear that the position Infinite Jest occupies is steadfastly non-
critical, and, finally, contradictory. Adorno’s model of negation is not necessarily the standard 
by which all texts must be judged. Infinite Jest, however, is what might be called a novel of 
ideas; because of this, any interlocution of the novel must take into account not only those 
ideas the novel engages with explicitly – the adumbration of which has become the primary 
mode of most Wallace criticism – but how, and on what basis, such philosophising takes 
place. The issue, therefore, is not that Infinite Jest fails as a novel, but how, through taking the 
novel as not just a representation of the world but a mode of thought in itself, the text’s 
philosophical critique is negated by the form such critique takes. 
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Conclusion 
 
Like a wave breaking on a rock, giving up 
Its shape in a gesture which expresses that shape. 
 
- John Ashbery, “Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror” 
 
What I hope to have shown in looking at Lerner and Wallace in tandem is how ekphrasis and 
embedded art objects reflect the larger problematic of the novel mode. Both novels are 
overwhelmingly concerned with the question of reference – of how text can relate to the 
world. The representation of the art object thus offers a framework for examining this 
concern; due to the nature of ekphrasis, however, such typically ‘postmodern’ questions can 
be rephrased in relation to the aesthetic tradition in order to give a more nuanced account of 
how each novel functions. I want now to make clear what I see as the central difference 
between each novel’s figuring of the subject-world relation, and, perhaps more importantly, 
extrapolate from this difference how I understand ekphrasis and the embedded art object as 
relating to the project of literary criticism in general. This latter claim might sound grand; what 
I hope to achieve here, however, is not some new theoretical paradigm – the small pool of 
texts that actually include the ekphrastic mode is, of course, essentially limiting – but instead 
to provide an example of how, through moving the questioning of the embedded art object 
away from representational adequacy and towards a wider conception of aesthetics, it might 
be possible to arrive at productive – and original – ways in which to consider the literary text.25 
The central event of Leaving the Atocha Station is the bombing of the Atocha station in Madrid: 
it is what precipitates the demonstrations in which Adam reluctantly takes part, and therefore 
                                                
25 Contemporary novels which employ the ekphrastic mode are few and far between, but exciting examples do exist: during 
the writing of this thesis Rachel Kushner’s The Flamethrowers was published, a novel which – had it been available earlier – 
would surely have had a larger role in the present piece. Suffice to say, the novel is concerned with many of the questions I 
raise here, and is one I hope to incorporate into any further revisions of this project. Lerner’s review of The Flamethrowers is 
worth noting: Lerner sees in the novel a dichotomy between Fried and Peter Bürger’s perspectives on the relation of art to 
life, concluding that ‘fiction is peculiarly suited to tracking the dispersion of art into performance’ (Lerner “A Trace of a 
Trace”).  
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catalyses much of the action in the novel’s third act. What is particularly important, however, 
is that the discourse around this event is explicitly concerned with the relation of an event or 
thing to its representation; that is, the relation of actual to virtual, art to life. This is a concern 
throughout the novel, but in this case it takes on a particular urgency: if the actual is 
characterised by action-orientation, an event that occupies a single moment in time and yet 
has such extensive repercussions seems to make obvious the distinction between actual and 
virtual. In the novel this idea is subverted, however, by Adam’s reaction to the bombings: 
excepting a half-hearted attempt to give blood, Adam mostly withdraws from the actual 
experience of the bombings’ aftermath and instead reads articles online that, as he states, 
‘describ[e] the helicopters I could hear above me’ (118). What becomes obvious here is the 
ambivalent nature of the relationship of subject and object when the distinction between 
actual and virtual is blurred. Throughout this thesis, I have emphasised the productive 
potential of the dialectical tension on which the novel is based. Yet it is also important to note 
that the impossibility of a wholly accessible object also opens up the possibility for 
manipulation: if a subject-object encounter consists of the actual existence of the object and 
the virtual experience of the subject, events such as the Madrid bombings – or to perhaps a 
less obvious extent the drowning of the girl in Mexico – make clear the limitations of such a 
schema as a universally ethical system. Leaving the Atocha Station ends with a seemingly positive 
celebration of the actual-virtual dialectic, yet this is undermined by the paragraphs which 
immediately precede it. Adam is prompted by seeing Teresa to state that ‘[w]e didn’t know 
many working people’, in reference to an earlier conversation in which, upon being asked if 
she knew anyone who had died in the bombings, Teresa ‘said many of the dead were 
immigrants…that it was a crime against working people and she didn’t know many working 
people’ (180,126). In the narrative present of the novel’s conclusion, Adam then asks a friend 
if he can name ‘a famous living poet’. The friend cannot; the line between ‘virtual’ art and 
‘actual’ life seems to again be emphasised, or at least acknowledged, in the lack of connection 
between the space Adam and Teresa inhabit as poets and artists and the lives of other, less 
privileged characters – or ‘working people’ – who do not appear in the novel. The implication 
is that through emphasising the indiscernibility of actual and virtual an excuse can be made for 
disengagement. While the distinction between actual and virtual is broken down throughout 
the novel, there is a certain sense that this model is one of compromise: the productive 
possibility of ‘exacerbating contradictions’ and the ‘pure potentiality’ of the virtual in itself do 
not result in change in a political, social or even ethical sense, but is rather a condition or 
mode of being in which such changes have the potential to occur.   
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This is consistent with how art is conceptualised throughout the novel, as Adam constantly 
emphasises the impotency of art as an agent for action. He is particularly fond of repeating 
Auden’s famous line that ‘poetry makes nothing happen’, but – just as the original line is 
clarified by the suggestion that poetry rather ‘survives…is a way of happening, a mouth’ – 
Adam’s lack of faith in art’s relation to the world is complicated by his own status as a poet 
(Auden 36, 41). Adam inhabits the contradictory space of writing a political poem while 
proclaiming the inefficacy of poetry based on its inherent separation from the actual world of 
war and bombs. Of course, the novel itself also inhabits this position: it exhibits a tension 
between acknowledging the impossibility of unmediated access to the ‘actual’ when the actual 
is construed as an object, while simultaneously suggesting that the novel is itself a mode of 
being, an event no less actual or virtual than any other. Adam’s insistence that he ‘would never 
write a novel’ is therefore not just an ironic nod at the reader. It is in the inherent impossibility 
of thought to be coeval with its object that the novel’s mode of being is found. In this sense, 
Lerner’s novel exhibits a sensibility much like Adorno’s negatively charged aura; like the lyric, 
Leaving the Atocha Station is auratic in that the text makes clear the limits of its form, while 
suggesting through content that critical agency can be found in this lack. The story event of 
the Madrid bombings therefore catalyses much of the narrative’s movement, but it fails to 
change in any meaningful way the relationship between actual and virtual configured in the 
novel up to the point of its occurrence. To do so would be disingenuous because while the 
bombings exist extra-textually, within the novel they are no less actual or virtual than any 
other object of reference. Leaving the Atocha Station includes important historical events but is 
not in any direct sense about them; rather, Lerner refers to such events to reiterate a point that 
could theoretically be made about any event but is made particularly apparent in the case of 
those which carry enormous weight outside of the novel.   
It is possible to see in this position echoes of Fredric Jameson: as described by Bewes, 
Jameson understands postmodern cultural production as ‘a form which has reached its own 
limits, which is determined by necessary failure, and which resolves the supposed antinomies 
of modernity simply by inhabiting them as their “cultural logic”’ (Bewes Event 18). Bewes 
argues, however, that such theories are limited by a periodising impulse that recognises 
postmodern literature as ‘a form that incarnates failure, inherent impossibility’ through 
understanding formal features – such as double-coding or metafiction – only in relation to a 
more general postmodern aesthetic characterised by depthlessness, banality, and nihilism 
(Bewes Event 7). Such forms of criticism neglect to discuss the novel form itself, and thus 
ignore those aspects of a text that subvert this generalisation. Turning to Lyotard, Bewes 
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suggests that rather than leading to negativity, nihilism and flatness, the postmodern literary 
text is in fact animated by its own impossibility, by ‘the task of making a presentation in a 
situation where presentation has become impossible’ (Bewes Event 7). While Bewes does not 
refer to either theorist, it is not difficult to trace such remarks to the same strain of critical 
theory as Benjamin and Adorno. Like these theorists, Bewes is suggesting that there exists a 
point at which the art object is itself an event, and that ‘[i]n this moment the ethical substance 
of the text exceeds mere “ethical” commentary, abolishing the ethical simultaneously with its 
inauguration as the spiritual actuality of the material world’ (Bewes Event 14).26 To this ethics 
predicated on ‘spiritual actuality’, compare Adorno’s own ethical configuration, described in 
the previous chapter, wherein critical agency – a glimpse of alterity – is found through auratic 
distance. In both cases the ethical or critical response is a material and sensuous rather than 
wholly intellectual experience; the ethical ‘comes into being only at the moment of its 
disappearance into sensation’ (Bewes Event 18). In this sense, Bewes’ argument is important 
here as it suggests a distinction between accounts of the postmodern which, through their 
periodising impulse, in fact ignore the particulars of the individual novel’s relation to the 
world, and a history of critical theory that instead emphasises attention to subject-object 
relations rather than questioning only representational adequacy.  
To return to the texts under discussion, then: Adam’s statement that he ‘would never write a 
novel’ indicates not just a concern with art’s ability to represent life, but also with the 
possibility of the novel to exist as an event in itself, as a ‘way of happening’. This coevality of 
experience is gestured towards within the novel, when Adam reads Tolstoy on the train to 
Granada: 
I flipped through the Tolstoy for a half-remembered passage about a train, but 
couldn’t find it. It didn’t matter; every sentence, regardless of its subject, became 
mimetic of the action of the train, and the train mimetic of the sentence, and I felt 
suddenly coeval with its syntax. Because the sentences of Tolstoy, or rather 
Constance Garnett’s translations of Tolstoy, were in perfect harmony with the 
motion of the Talgo, real time and the time of prose began to merge, and reading, 
instead of removing me from the world, intensified my experience of the present. 
(89) 
                                                
26 The exact nature of such an ‘event’ is not delineated by Bewes in this essay, though in other work on the same topic he 
suggests that the concept as he uses it derives from a nexus of Deleuze, Lyotard and Alain Badiou (Bewes Escape n.1,47) . The 
inclusion of Badiou here does not clarify things exactly; Badiou himself seems uncertain on what constitutes an event, despite 
it forming the cornerstone of much of his mathematically-based ontology. Badiou’s philosophy is immensely complex and 
regrettably falls outside of the scope of this thesis; it is enough to refer here to two points: his summation of the event as that 
which ‘compels us to decide a new way of being’ and his description of the event as a supplement – i.e. an excess – existing 
outside of ontology (Badiou Ethics 41).  
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The idea of translation is important here: Adam is aware that his experience of Tolstoy is 
already twice-removed, and so it is not through accessing the text itself that his experience of 
the present is intensified. Unlike Lukács’s ‘happy ages’, here an awareness of mediation itself 
becomes part of sensuous experience. For Adam, such an experience is reminiscent of reading 
John Ashbery. Adam suggests that in Ashbery ‘one could experience the texture of time as it 
passed, a shadow train, life’s white machine’; that the lines reproduce the propulsion of 
thought without the corresponding particularity of thoughts or stable referents (90).27 The 
effect is that mediation is experienced immediately: ‘as though the actual Ashbery poem were 
concealed from you, written on the other side of a mirrored surface, and you saw only the 
reflection of your reading’, thereby creating a kind of presence in which the ‘virtual 
possibilities of poetry’ remain intact (91).28 What Adam locates in Ashbery’s work is that 
which Adorno and Benjamin figured in the lyric mode – that is, a profundity derived from 
absence. The absence – or loss – of an accessible actual – a stable referent, in the terms Lerner 
employs in relation to Ashbery – is the same condition Lukács considers to be the world of 
the novel; the experience of subjective mediation simply is experience. In this sense, Ashbery’s 
brief appearance in Leaving the Atocha Station is important: it offers a concrete example of what 
the coevality of thought and experience Adam experiences when reading Tolstoy might look 
like outside of the novel. This seems, to my mind, to be an experience quite different from the 
idea of postmodern impossibility or metatextuality as conceptualised by Jameson and (many) 
others: as in the reading of Leaving the Atocha Station I have offered thus far, what Adam finds 
in Ashbery is instead the negative determination of the lyric mode.  
In Leaving the Atocha Station, the tension between actual and virtual is the function of an 
ontology which posits the object as fundamentally inscrutable. Infinite Jest instead represents a 
textual world that is less obviously ‘realist’ than Lerner’s while also appearing to emphasise its 
own objecthood – the novel’s size and the extent of its footnotes making the reader constantly 
aware of its physicality.29 Yet Infinite Jest does all this while also remaining committed to an 
                                                
27 Adam’s reading of Ashbery is actually Lerner’s: Lerner published an essay prior to the publication of Leaving the Atocha 
Station, “The Future Continuous: Ashbery’s Lyric Mediacy”, in which he argues that Ashbery makes us ‘attend to our 
attention’ and experience our own experience of the temporality of reading (Lerner 209). Lerner also makes the point that in 
Ashbery what appears to be an impatience with criticism is in fact exasperation with its redundancy when his poetry is itself 
‘already a kind of secondary text’ (Lerner Ashbery 209). Ashbery’s relationship to criticism is therefore, like Lerner’s, far more 
complex than a simple equation of intellectualism with abstraction. 
28 Though not referenced in the novel or Lerner’s essay, John Bayley’s essay on Ashbery suggests a similar reading: Bayley 
refers to Ashbery’s work as ‘ghost’ or ‘shadow’ poetry because it is based upon the premise that ‘we can never see the object 
or the person as it really is, never quite know what we see or see what we know’ (Bayley 35).  
29  Wallace’s aesthetic has been compared to Incandenza’s own ‘radical realism’, presenting the ‘unfiltered babble of the 
peripheral crowd’ (LeClair 32). Yet despite the multitude of narrative voices in the novel, there still remain instances – such as 
the example of the tense shift to the gnomic present detailed above – in which this appearance of messiness is shown still to 
be subject to the novel’s central aesthetic and ontological organising principles.  
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accessible real that is inaccessible through language. The project of Infinite Jest to an extent thus 
undermines itself. Rather than accepting the limitations of the novel mode as a way of 
thought, Infinite Jest seems to impose itself on the reader as a material object – as part of the 
real, actual world. As in the treatment of The Ecstasy of St Theresa, Wallace accepts physical 
presence as the absolute against which all other experience is judged.  
That each novel is predicated on such different aesthetic and philosophical schemata might 
not seem problematic in itself. Yet such differences have implications for the critic; the 
subject-object relations demonstrate two quite different conceptions of how the world is to be 
accounted for in thought. As discussed previously, in Leaving the Atocha Station critical theory is 
incorporated into the narrative discourse seamlessly: Adam quotes from Lukács, Adorno and 
others without citation. This is in direct contrast with Infinite Jest, wherein ‘theory’ in general is 
derided and made strange: theoretical discourse is represented as excessively detailed (the 
filmography) or simply ridiculous (Geoffrey Day). The problem with the latter approach, 
however, is that it ignores the historical moment of its writing, in which theoretical discourse 
is as much a part of experience as the physical or corporeal. Such a position is impossible to 
successfully maintain within the constructed object of the literary text; it implies a hierarchical 
model of referential adequacy which is eventually untenable. There is a comparison to be 
drawn here to what Jacques Rancière identifies as the problem with Fried’s work: the latter’s 
anti-theatre position is paradoxical because it is derived directly from the theatre, being ‘the 
theory of a dramatic action that would pretend to be invisible, to be viewed by no audience, to 
be nothing but life in its pure similarity to itself’ (Rancière 88). As Rancière points out, 
however, this leads to the question: ‘what need would life in its pure similarity, life ‘not looked 
at’, not made into a spectacle, have of speaking?’ (Rancière 88). Infinite Jest similarly suggests 
that the actual world cannot be accessed or represented in text, and yet it is a textual object 
itself. Its relationship to the actual is one of mediation, and this mediation is highlighted within 
the novel. Yet there is always the implication that this mediation is not essential, that 
subjectivity can be transcended through pure experience of the actual.  
What Lerner in Leaving the Atocha Station attempts to evoke is, in contrast, the texture of 
experience itself. If, as Deleuze and Bergson suggest, we experience time as duration, then all 
experience must be essentially poised between the actual and virtual – between action and 
thought. It makes sense, then, that when Adam states that he will ‘never write a novel’ it is 
because narrative – and thought itself – is unable to capture the sensual experience of 
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duration; though narrative by necessity moves forwards, it is based around individual events 
and can thus only represent the actual:  
These periods of rain or periods between rains in which I was smoking and 
reading Tolstoy would be, I knew, impossible to narrate, and that impossibility 
entered the experience…Not the little lyric miracles and luminous branching 
injuries, but the other thing, whatever it was, was life, and was falsified by any way 
of talking or writing or thinking that emphasized sharply localized occurrences in 
time. (64) 
Note that here Adam does not differentiate between ‘writing and thinking’. Rather than 
positing a particular failure of the literary to capture the object, what is suggested here is the 
impossibility of all modes of thought to capture duration. It is for this reason that studies of 
ekphrasis that focus solely on the question of reference are limiting: what Leaving the Atocha 
Station shows is instead how art objects act as something like microcosms of a larger relation 
between subject and world that goes beyond the capacity for representation. As Lukács states 
in The Theory of the Novel, the division upon which the novel form is based (and therefore 
reflects) is between ‘the conventionality of the objective world and the interiority of the 
subjective one’ (Lukács Novel 70). While both Leaving the Atocha Station and Infinite Jest are 
concerned with whether the experience of language can be coeval with the sensual experience 
of the real, the essential difference is that while Wallace posits a real based on physicality and 
presence, and therefore emphasises the inability of language to have the same effect, Lerner is 
concerned with the idea that text itself is a sensual experience – not solely in a physical or 
material sense, though Leaving the Atocha Station certainly destabilises the boundary between 
materiality and language through the use of the embedded photographs – but in the sense that 
its reading can be an event in itself. Lerner thus attempts not just to represent the actual but to 
provide an experience that is in and of itself equal to non-textual experience.  
As stated, such perspectives have implications for the act of criticism itself. A large part of 
why Michael Fried is against ‘literalist’ art is that it ‘seeks to declare and occupy a position—
one that can be formulated in words and in fact has been so formulated by some of its leading 
practitioners’ (Fried 148). Fried is referring in particular to the writings of Donald Judd, whose 
“Specific Objects” clearly delineates the minimalist ethos, and from which Fried quotes 
throughout his essay (Judd 181). Fried implies that it should not be possible to articulate the 
‘position’ of art; his criticism of Judd et al is based on a clear definition, sustained throughout 
the essay, between art that has such a position (and which is therefore implicitly non-
autonomous; it is enmeshed in the situation of its inception) and art that does not (i.e. 
modernist, autonomous art). That Fried figures this separation through the ability for art’s 
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position to be articulated – for the object to be translated into thought – is central. Wallace 
and Fried share a suspicion of this articulation, not because of a characteristically 
‘postmodern’ sensibility that suggests there is no outside real to be articulated, but because a 
position that can be ‘formulated in words’ – that is, in criticism – suggests that the object can 
be translated into thought, a suggestion which would undermine the entirety of the 
hierarchical metaphysical system upon which their thought is predicated. While Lerner’s text 
also suggests that the object is inaccessible, the crucial difference is that in Leaving the Atocha 
Station this impossibility is applied to all thought. Because there is no single static experience 
of the object – because experience is duration, and duration includes both the actual and the 
virtual – it would be impossible to simulate such an experience in text. What Lerner is attuned 
to, however, is the ability for the text to momentarily generate the full complexity of this 
experience, crucially including the feeling of impossibility or inaccessibility that characterises our 
experience of the objective world. An essential part of this experience is the inclusion of 
critical discourse. To posit, as Wallace does, a gulf between language and experience that is 
forever unbridgeable is to deny the possibility that language might reflect or comment on the 
present moment, to section theory off from any experience of the ‘actual’ and to suggest that 
while an object can be experienced in full, can prompt transcendental experience through 
physicality, this experience is in some way separate and distinct from all others – and from the 
virtual. 
The work of the virtual – that is, intellectual work – is equated in Wallace to disengagement 
from the real, to solipsism and thus to a failure of empathy. In the model of the AA 
programme, thought is itself evacuated of its virtual potential; through the anti-intellectual 
gesture of reiterating clichés and bromides, Wallace suggests that ahistorical, non-reflective 
thought is the kind that produces change. Those who submit to the AA programme become 
better people, but because the novel is based around the negative capacity of thought – the 
desperation and recursive thinking typical of addicts – there is a blanket assumption that any 
thought that is not action-oriented – i.e. the virtual – results in despair. The kinds of 
sentimentality and pathos Wallace employs are therefore understandable: in emphasising the 
truth value of such received statements, however, Wallace suggests a schema in which the 
potential for critical agency is suppressed.  
What Wallace finally suggests, then, is a schema in which the actual and virtual are not 
meaningfully linked and in which the art object is therefore essentially separate from life. The 
text of Infinite Jest leaves us in no doubt that Wallace’s project was based on articulating a 
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system of ethics, of suggesting that through becoming aware of mediation one can somehow 
fight through and achieve unadulterated access to the actual, and become more empathetic 
and aware as a result. Yet in doing so, Wallace fails to acknowledge the place that mediation 
has in developing this and any conception of ethics. If we follow Adam’s reading of Ashbery, 
any contemplation of the present moment must incorporate the act of reflection itself. A lack 
of theory therefore means a lack of examination of the present world at hand; thus in Wallace 
we find an ahistorical concept of ethics that undermines itself by drawing a firm line between 
the world and our ability to think it. In contrast, in Lerner we can see a concern with, if not an 
attempt at, the collapsing of art into experience. Leaving the Atocha Station is far less concerned 
with received notions of ethical responsibility or even spirituality than Infinite Jest. Rather, the 
schema upon which it is predicated gestures towards the conditions necessary for any change 
– collective or individual – to occur. Lerner’s idealist vision at the novel’s close is tempered by 
what precedes it; the limitations of the various critical axes it draws from are therefore made 
clear. What both novels offer, then, is a compromised response to the division between 
subjective and objective worlds Lukács identifies: as ekphrasis suggests, perhaps the novel as a 
mode of thought is best suited to expressing its own limitation.  
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